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Since the end of WWII, a host of groups and states have pursued their interests in 
the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) environment [Ref.11].  One of the characteristics of LIC 
is that it is executed mostly by the rules of asymmetric war or guerrilla warfare.  Guerrilla 
warfare is a set of military tactics utilized by a group within a state or a local population 
in order to oppose the government or foreign occupying forces [Ref.5].  In essence, 
guerrilla warfare determines the shape of the battlefield in the Low Intensity Conflict 
environment while remaining a potent weapon for which armed forces must increasingly 
be prepared.  One of the best examples of guerrilla warfare is in Turkey—where 
conventional Turkish Forces, with more than 100,000 soldiers, have been continuously 
fighting against approximately 10,000 PKK terrorists for more than 15 years.  During this 
conflict, more than 30,000 people have been killed, including about 4,000 Turkish 
soldiers. 
Recently, many analysts are realizing that conventional Operations Research tools 
based on precise mathematical equations and a detailed physical description of combat 
cannot provide a realistic picture of the complex and dynamic situations in which many 
military operations, particularly guerrilla-type operations, are conducted.  With the 
advent of complexity theory and its application to warfare studies, some researchers are 
viewing warfare as a complex adaptive system (CAS), which adapts, evolves and co-
evolves with its environment [Ref.6].  In this sense, a guerrilla force also behaves like a 
complex system, not only interacting with its environment but also dynamically (and 
often nonlinear) interacting between components of the system, namely the interactions 
between different levels of commanders and the commanders with the enemy.  In 
summary, the focus is on the emergent patterns of the whole rather than the individual 
parts. 
Agent-based models (ABM) offer an opportunity to analyze the above-mentioned 
complex problems by concentrating on the behaviors of and interactions between the 
participating entities instead of the performance of specific weapons or sensors [Ref.4].  
 xxii
This is particularly important in guerrilla warfare where one side usually dominates with 
respect to firepower.  In other words, we shift our attention from analyzing the 
performance of pieces of equipment to how different modes of operation and human 
traits may alter the outcome of a combat or peacekeeping operation.  Attention is focused 
on how a guerrilla force utilizes information and acts upon it, and what the consequences 
are on the success of a mission. 
The use of intelligent agents to study the emergent behaviors of complex systems 
and operations, such as the roles played by training, aggressiveness or the effectiveness 
of command-and-control in combat performance, has attracted much attention in the 
military operations research (OR) community in recent years [Ref.4].  Notable examples 
are models like the Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC) [Ref.6] 
initiated by the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the 
Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) [Ref.1] developed by the Defense 
Technology Agency (DTA), New Zealand. 
This thesis utilizes the recently developed agent-based model Map Aware Non-
Uniform Automata (MANA) to explore non-linearity and intangibles inherent in guerrilla 
warfare. 
An infiltration scenario is developed based on the author’s experiences fighting 
guerrillas in the mountains of Southeast Turkey.  In September 1999, I was a platoon 
commander of a battalion stationed in one of the rural areas in the Southeast of Turkey.  
The platoon received a mission order from the battalion commander to form a tank-
infantry platoon and to move immediately to the top of a nearby hill.  The platoon’s task 
was to take up a position on the hill and protect the area against any terrorist activities.  
This location was very critical for both sides, because terrorists were using this territory 
as a passage from northern Iraq to Turkey.  From this peak, the platoon could easily 
monitor and interdict the terrorists.  Consequently, we expected the terrorists to attempt 
sneaking into our base to damage assets, cause some casualties, and demolish morale.  
In this scenario, the Blue force, which represents the friendly side, is composed of 
two tanks, two ACVs (Armored Combat Vehicle), and 11 infantry.  The Red force, which 
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represents terrorists, is composed of 11 guerrillas equipped with light infantry weapons.  
Two of these terrorists form a reconnaissance team.  The remaining nine terrorists split 
into two infiltration teams.  The screenshot below is the base-line scenario; it is best 
viewed in color. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Infiltration Scenario (base- line) developed for use with MANA 
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to explore this scenario in MANA and to create 
statistical models predicting Blue and Red casualties.  To simultaneously investigate the 
effects of as many as 22 input variables, recently developed Near Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube Designs and Fractional Factorial Designs are used.  Utilizing a personal 
computer and the computational capabilities of supercomputers run by Mitre for the 
Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC), approximately 200,000 MANA 
runs were completed.  The data are analyzed and graphically displayed using S-Plus, 
Clementine, Ggobi, and Netica Software packages.  Several statistical models are 
developed and compared using a variety of diverse statistical techniques, including 
 xxiv
Cluster Analysis, Neural Networks, Regression Trees, Linear Regression, and Bayesian 
Networks. 
This thesis also presents an examination of some low-intensity conflicts and  
guerrilla battles that were fought in the second half of the 20th century.  In this 
examination, the focus is on the human dimensions of the battlefield, the tactics, and the 
techniques, which are particularly unique to guerrilla troops.  Following this close look at 
some guerrilla battles, the fundamentals, nature, and the tactics of guerrilla warfare are 
emphasized. 
Interesting findings of this study include: 
· Results (MOEs) are mostly affected by factors associated with the Red 
force.  In particular, the Red team’s stealth is the most important factor in 
terms of both Blue and Red casualties. 
· More cohesive guerrilla forces who do not stay with their injured and form 
big groups when attacking the enemy get better outcomes in an infiltration 
operation. 
· Guerrillas obtain the best results in terms of enemy casualties by being 
aggressive, attacking enemy vehicles/commanders and repelling enemy 
infantry.  However, this personality also causes them more casualties. 
· In this specific infiltration scenario, the Red side can negate the Blue 
side’s advantage in firepower and numbers by using 16 to 27 guerrillas in 
each infiltration team. 
· Regression Tree models, enhanced with MART, and Bayesian Network 
models are the most valuable analysis tools in this study.  Specifically, 
they have the best visual representations of the data that are easy to 
interpret.  Moreover, these models provide at least as good predictive 




“It is with the muscles of the intellect, with something like cerebral reflexes that 
the man of war decides, and it is with his qualities of character that he maintains the 
decision taken. He who remains in abstractions falls into formula; he concretes his brain; 
he is beaten in advance.” 
General Cordonnier (French Commander) 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Since the end of WWII, a host of groups and states have pursued their interests in 
the Low Intensity Conflict environment.  Many international wars and insurgencies have 
taken a heavy toll of lives and treasure [Ref.11].  Most of these wars have occurred in the 
Third World, changing the international environment.  Many Third World conflicts were 
originated in the struggle to end the system of European empires.  As nations achieved 
this goal, clashes among more or less conventional military forces sought to resolve 
artificially imposed relationships among newly independent states.  This type of conflict 
continues.  More frequently, insurgents have sought to alter the political, social and 
economic organization of these states, bringing about internal conflicts, which also 
continue.  However, the means by which groups and nations conduct these conflicts have 
changed significantly, increasing the risks in the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) 
environment [Ref.11].  One of the characteristics of LIC is that it is executed mostly by 
the rules of asymmetric war or guerrilla warfare. 
Guerrilla warfare is a set of military tactics utilized by a group within a state or a 
local population in order to oppose the government or foreign occupying forces [Ref.5].  
In essence, guerrilla warfare determines the shape of the battlefield in the Low Intensity 
Conflict environment and it remains a potent weapon for which armed forces increasingly 
must be prepared.  
Recently, many analysts are realizing that conventional Operations Research tools 
based on rigorous mathematical equations and a detailed physical description of combat 
cannot provide a realistic picture of the complex and dynamic situations in which many 
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military operations, and particularly guerrilla-type operations, are conducted.  In such 
operations, either war-fighting or peacekeeping, the participants have to interact with 
hostile or potentially hostile forces, by responding to their actions.  In the process, a new 
situation or environment is created, which in turn triggers off new responses from both 
sides.  Furthermore, war arouses some of the strongest human emotions, making it 
difficult to anticipate the behaviors of individuals in a command and control chain 
[Ref.4]. 
In 1914, F.W. Lanchester established some differential equations, now known as 
Lanchester Equations (LEs), to model battles.  There have been many extensions to and 
generalizations of the LEs over the years.  These types of models are called equation-
based and are usually deterministic models.  A primary drawback of equation-based 
models (EBMs) is that they do not deal well with the dynamics of interactions between 
the combating sides nor their reactions to each other’s actions.  Another serious challenge 
to EBMs is that the world is fundamentally nonlinear, and, consequently, many problems 
defy the traditional scientific approach of analysis by decomposition.  The non-linearity 
of war-fighting means that a small perturbation to some critical elements (initial 
conditions) can profoundly alter the outcomes, thus, making reliable prediction extremely 
difficult, if not impossible [Ref.4].  Finally, EBMs have great difficulty in modeling the 
so-called intangibles of warfare, such as human emotions, aggressiveness, fear, anger, 
team cohesion and so on. 
With the advent of complexity theory and its application to warfare studies, some 
researchers are viewing warfare as a complex adaptive system (CAS), which adapts, 
evolves and co-evolves with its environment [Ref.6].  In this sense, a guerrilla force also 
behaves like a complex system, not only interacting with its environment but also 
dynamically (and often nonlinearly) interacting between components of the system, 
namely the interactions between different levels of commanders and the commanders 
with the enemy.  Conventional EBM are not equipped to deal with such ever-changing 
conditions and non- linearity.  At best, one can use EBM to explore a range of 
possibilities, with a limited number of responses or contingency plans built into the war-
gaming.  This, however, is far from being adequate for describing the behavior of a 
system as it adapts and evolves with the changing environment. 
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Agent-based models (ABMs) offer an opportunity to analyze the above-
mentioned complex problems by concentrating on the behaviors of and interactions 
between the participating entities instead of the performance of specific weapons or 
sensors [Ref.4].  This is particularly important in guerrilla warfare where one side usually 
dominates with respect to firepower.  In other words, we shift our attention from 
analyzing the performance of pieces of equipment to how different modes of operation 
may alter the outcome of a combat or peacekeeping operation.  Attention is focused on 
how a guerrilla force utilizes information and acts upon it, and the consequence on the 
success of a mission.  In summary, the focus is on the emergent patterns of the whole 
rather than the individual parts. 
The use of intelligent agents to study the emergent behaviors of complex systems 
and operations, such as the roles played by training, aggressiveness or the effectiveness 
of command-and-control in combat performance, has attracted much attention in the 
military operations research (OR) community in recent years [Ref.4].  Notable examples 
are models like the Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC) [Ref.6] 
initiated by the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the 
Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) [Ref.1] developed by the Defense 
Technology Agency (DTA), New Zealand. 
 
B. PURPOSE AND RATIONALE 
The purpose of this thesis is to utilize MANA as a scenario exploration tool with 
which to explore and exploit the non- linearity and intangibles arising from various 
interactions between Conventional and Guerrilla forces and their surroundings.  
Additionally, this study intends to find unsuspected links between a variety of factors in 
order to design a model that can explain these relationships reasonably well.  We 
concentrate on the factors that affect the outcomes the most.  These factors can be seen in 
the next chapter as well as Appendix E and Appendix F.  We answer the following 
questions based on the results at the end of the analysis:  
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1. Which configuration is tactically more efficient for the Blue side, in the 
scenario used in the analysis, positioning vehicles up to the North, and infantries down to 
the South or locating the vehicles on the main directions, and infantries in between them?  
2. In infiltration operations, guerrilla forces use single or multiple lanes to 
approach and attack the enemy’s base.  Which one is tactically more reasonable, in our 
scenario (see chapter III for scenario description), based on the success of the mission? 
3. In our scenario, the Blue side has a significant superiority over the red in terms  
of the number of agents.  How many agents are needed on the red side to overcome this 
deficiency?  
4. In guerrilla warfare, the “men over weapon” concept steps forward in most 
situations.  What significance does the Red side’s personality changes (e.g., 
aggressiveness, cohesion, trust, fear, etc.), when engaging with the enemy, have on the 
outcome of the battle? 
5. In case of a skirmish, the key objective for both sides, which leads to a 
successful operation, is the effective use of weapons.  What is the optimum number of 
targets to be assigned to each member of the Red reconnaissance team when taking into 
account their firepower and fire range?  
6. Under fire suppression many infantrymen tend to hide and take shots at the 
enemy without aiming at them.  This kind of attitude leads to increasing stealth and 
decreasing sensor range.  What consequences result, for both sides, under different 
circumstances when changing these parameters?  
7. Unit cohesion can be perceived as the bonding together of members of a 
guerrilla force in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their 
unit and the mission.  Does unit cohesion have a significant affect on the outcome of the 
battle in a guerrilla-style war? 
It is very important to realize that MANA is not intended to describe every aspect 
of a military operation.  MANA’s limitations must also be noted.  Rather than having 
heavily pre-potted behavior representing a “perfect way” of doing things, we explore 
many different ways of accomplishing tasks quite quickly (due to the simplicity of the 
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model), even if they are “imperfect”.  After all, to be able to ask which kinds of 
formations appear to produce the best results, without placing constraints upon ourselves, 
is highly useful [Ref.1]. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II provides the background 
motivation.  Chapter III (supplemented with Appendix B) gives a detailed description of 
the scenarios, research questions, the model (MANA), and its parameters.  Chapter IV 
explains the analysis methodologies used to explore the MANA data while chapter V 
explains the results of the analysis and uses these results to examine the research 
questions.  Chapter VI provides a list of recommendations for MCCDC, for DTA, and for 
the analysts in improving the analysis of LIC and the development of MANA. 
 
C. THESIS SCOPE 
MANA has approximately 37 parameters, 30 of which can take different values 
for different trigger states.  There are 10 trigger states.  Roughly speaking, there are 307 
parameters.  To explore the effects of varying 307 parameters is a demoralizing task.  For 
example, a two- level full factorial design requires 2307 = 2.6 x 1092 runs to obtain one data 
point for each of the possible combinations.  Even if a fractional factorial design is used it 
will not help us in this case.  Therefore, 22 parameters are determined, which are believed 
a priori most likely influence the results.  We also decided to have 129 levels of each 
parameter.  With 22 factors and 129 levels we are not able to use factorial designs.  
Therefore, modified Latin Hypercube designs are used, which allow improved coverage 
of the input space.  Thousands of preliminary runs were completed to explore many of 
the parameters in MANA.  Following these preliminary runs, the model, together with the 
scenarios and the parameters that will be changed, were sent to Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC) for 153,900 runs.  After further analysis of the 
results, the most important six parameters are chosen.  Since the number of variables is 
within the computational capabilities of fractional factorial designs, this time a 36-1 
fractional factorial design is used.  For the second time, the model, the base- line scenario 
and the design were sent to MCCDC for 24,300 runs.  MCCDC formed a cluster of 
workstations, called “Gilgamesh”, which provides analysts the ability to run some agent-
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based models, like MANA, more than 100,000 times within a couple of days and to 




II.  BACKGROUND 
“There is no studying on the battlefield. It is then simply a case of doing what is 




A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II presents an examination of some low-intensity conflicts and guerrilla 
battles that were fought in the second half of the 20th century.  In this examination, the 
focus is on the human dimensions of the battlefield, the tactics, and the techniques, which 
are particularly unique to guerrilla troops.  Following this close look at some guerrilla 
battles, the fundamentals, the nature, and the tactics of guerrilla warfare are emphasized.  
 
B. DEFINITIONS 
This section gives definitions for some of the expressions used in this chapter. 
Guerrilla literally means little war and derives from the activities during the 
Spanish national struggle against French occupying forces during the Peninsula War 
between 1808 and 1814 [Ref.5]. 
Guerrilla warfare or asymmetric war is a set of military tactic s utilized by a 
minority group within a state or a local population in order to oppose the government or 
foreign occupying forces [Ref.5]. 
Revolutionary guerilla warfare or insurgency is a campaign fought by a minority 
group within a state to gain political power through a combination of rebellion, 
propaganda, and military action [Ref.5]. 
Counter-guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency are the actions of existing 
governments and their armed forces to combat guerrilla warfare, insurgency and to 
prevent its resurgence [Ref.5]. 
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Insurgency is an effective means either of achieving power and influence in a 
state or of bringing a particular cause to the notice of the national or international 
community [Ref.12]. 
Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending 
states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition 
among states.  It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and 
ideologies [Ref.11]. 
 
C. HISTORY  
Nuclear parity, the successes of deterrence, and an increasingly interdependent 
world have created a period of transition in diplomatic relationships, especially between 
superpowers, such as the United States of America (USA) and Russia.  Regional powers 
have developed during this process, diffusing the international balance of power.  
Although the absolute strength of the superpowers has not declined, their relative strength 
in the world is less than it was two decades ago.  Lesser powers have proliferated and 
have their own interests to pursue.  Their independent actions provide many new 
possibilities for conflict, irrespective of relations among the superpowers [Ref.11].  
In some respects, the end of the Cold War with the disintegration of the 
communist system in the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 was expected to decrease 
the likelihood of conflict in the modern world.  Undoubtedly, the end of this war 
diminished the prospect of major global conflict and removed the external stimulus to 
many so-called “proxy” conflicts waged by the superpowers through groups in third 
countries.  The Gulf War in 1991 suggested that in a “new world order” the international 
community, acting in concert, would promptly restore peace wherever it was threatened.  
The reality is that the conflict has not ceased.  Between 1980 and 1990 there were 
approximately 60 conflicts inflicting 5.3 million deaths [Ref.37].  Whereas between 1990 
and 1996 at least 98 conflicts occurred inflicting 5.5 million deaths—with only 7 of these 
conflicts being waged between recognized states [Ref.5].  Taken together, these factors 
reveal a world with a high potential for violent conflict.  In other words, internal conflicts 
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and challenges to states from sub-national groups have not ended, and guerrilla warfare, 
or asymmetric war, remains as a potentially effective method to resolve these conflicts. 
In this study, we look at six guerrilla battles from the 20th century with the intent 
of drawing some conclusions from them in terms of guerrilla tactics and techniques.  The 
reason for choosing these six battles is that some of the important asymmetric war rules 
emerged from them.  We intend to provide some insights to these battles, which are not 
known broadly.  Brief summaries and lessons learned from these six asymmetric wars 
can be found in Appendix A.  The following section gives a summary of the lessons 
learned from these conflicts. 
 
D. COMMON LESSONS LEARNED FROM ALL SIX BATTLES 
After analyzing these six battles it has been noticed that some of the lessons are 
common for all of the battles.  These general conclusions are: 
· “Winning hearts and minds” appears as the primary approach, leading to 
the success of the guerrilla operation. 
· A small force can defeat a larger force if it achieves surprise and attacks 
the enemy where it least expects an attack.  
· Most guerrilla operations are offensive, not defensive—seldom is there an 
attempt to seize and defend objectives.  
· At the tactical level, one of the most important principles to be inferred 
from guerrilla operations is that guerrillas must be masters of their 
environment. 
· These conflicts also emphasized the significance of night combat and 
combat under poor weather conditions and the importance of safe havens. 
· These conflicts emphasized once again the need for a limit to the physical 
and mental strain that can be placed on guerrilla fighters. 
· In all conflicts, the development of timely, accurate intelligence led to the 
success of tactical operations. This intelligence originated in large measure 
from the local inhabitants and police organizations.  Good intelligence 
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appears to be a crucial cornerstone for guerrilla operations in 
counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflicts.  
· For most of the conflicts analyzed so far, guerrilla forces seem to have 
time on their side.  They prove to be more adaptable to tough conditions as 
opposed to anti-guerrilla forces.  Therefore, guerrilla forces can stand all 
kinds of poor weather conditions, in rugged terrain, surviving for a longer 
time.  This provides a big advantage in the long run.  Infantry units can 
overcome this disadvantage by using guerrilla rules.  In other words, 
whenever they can train themselves as guerrillas they win the battle in a 
short amount of time.  
 
E. GUERRILLA TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 
It has become a cliché that “today’s guerrilla is tomorrow’s statesman, although 
someone’s freedom fighter can just as equally be another’s terrorist.”  Guerrilla warfare is 
one characteristic of an insurgency where the guerrilla is the combat element in the 
insurgency.  When guerrilla forces first become operational, they usually engage in 
limited or small-scale operations.  If they reach more sophisticated levels of organization, 
equipment, and training, larger operations using more conventional tactics may be 
expected.  Insurgent tactics are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent 
action.  Inevitably, guerrilla groups operate in difficult terrain, such as mountains, 
deserts, and forests.  Within these environments, guerrillas possess local knowledge that 
is often denied their opponents.  Often, they enjoy a degree of popular support from local 
inhabitants.  Additionally, guerrillas are generally more mobile than their opponents and 
more prone to undertake “hit-and-run” raids enabling them to damage yet also evade their 
opponents, which thereby prolongs the struggle [Ref.11].  Guerrilla warfare can be also 
understood as a strategy of the weak faced by a stronger military power.  By these means 
guerrilla warfare can be called as an asymmetric war.  Guerrilla tactics in the early phases 





The guerrilla can use terrorism to accomplish his goals. Terrorist techniques 
include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilation, murder, torture, and 
blackmail.  Not all guerrillas use terrorism as a tool.  If terrorism is used, it is usually for 
coercion or intimidation.  Terrorism may also be used to discredit the government by 
provoking the government into overreactions alienating the populace or demonstrating its 
inability to protect them [Ref.11].  
 
a. Coercion 
Coercion persuades individuals to act favorably in given situations toward 
the guerrilla or insurgent movement, such as convincing a local mayor to revise policies 
on the guerrilla or ga ining passive support while at the same time redirecting resources to 
the insurgent movement.  
 
b. Intimidation 
Intimidation modifies behavior.  Generally-speaking, threats or fear of 
harm are used either toward the individual or his family and friends.  Intimidation 
induces the populace to silence or non-cooperation with government forces.  It 
discourages competent citizens from accepting vital low-level government positions, such 
as the killing of servicemen to encourage draft evasion. 
 
2. Harassment 
Harassment keeps government forces on the defensive.  If successful, it causes 
government forces to react to guerrilla operations.  As a result, the government cannot 
conduct offensive operations that would prevent successful guerrilla operations.  
Harassment also weakens the government's resources and disrupts lines of 
communication.  One advantage of harassment is the image it presents of the guerrilla 
being able to strike anywhere.  Also, the government appears ineffective and incompetent 
by constantly losing or not clearly winning many small battles.  This affects the morale of 
the government force and the populace [Ref.11].  
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The guerrillas use infiltration during movements.  However, near the target area, 
small guerrilla elements mass and then conduct operations.  The most common 
techniques employed by the guerrilla are the ambush, raid, and small-scale attacks.  
These are usually targeted against security posts, small forces, facilities, and Lines of 
Communication (LOC).  
While government forces outnumber the guerrillas, the guerrillas seek to attain a 
local numerical superiority so that they can attain victory over small elements of the 
government forces.  These tactics, if successful, compel government forces to commit 
larger elements to defensive tasks.  Once government forces move to the defensive, they 
lose the initiative and become reactive.  This allows the guerrilla force time and space to 
develop so that they can engage larger government forces with more conventional tactics 
[Ref.11]. 
 
F. THE NATURE OF GUERRILLA FORCES 
There are four primary characteristics that distinguish guerrilla forces from 
regular forces.  These are self- reliance, psychological advantage, mastery of the 
environment, and versatility.  The most important of these characteristics is an attitude of 
self-reliance.  Guerrilla forces in a number of ways exhibit this attitude of self-reliance.  
For example, guerrilla fighters typically demonstrate a strong will for surviving or 
succeeding in whatever situation they are found.  They are fearless about unfavorable 
conditions.  Furthermore, they are accustomed to austerity.  They have learned to do 
without comforts and benefits that other soldiers consider to be necessities.  These forces 
are not tied to a logistic lifeline.  Their attitude of self-reliance leads them to use any 
available resource to sustain themselves or to improve their combat capabilities.  
Moreover, guerrilla forces do not give up.  Even when outcomes seem inevitable, they 
stay in the fight and attempt to turn situations to their advantage.  Their self- reliance is 
typified by self-denial, fortitude, resolve, and resourcefulness.  
This attitude of self-reliance gives guerrilla forces a psychological advantage over 
their enemies.  Confident in their abilities, guerilla forces normally consider themselves 
to be tactically superior to their opponents.  Once they have demonstrated this tactical 
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superiority, their enemies often become fearful and wary.  Guerrilla forces use this 
psychological advantage to keep their enemies off-balance and tense.  Unpredictable, 
invisible to view, skilled with unanticipated methods, guerrilla forces can often paralyze 
the minds and wills of their enemies before a battle begins. 
This self- reliant attitude enables guerrilla forces to be the masters of their 
environment.  They do not fight, fear, or resist the environment; they embrace it as a 
shelter, protection, provider, and home.  A guerrilla learns to be comfortable and secure 
in any terrain and climate, be it jungle, mountain, desert, swamp, or arctic territory.  
Exceptionally adaptable, guerrilla units dominate the terrain in which they operate and 
use it to their advantage against their enemies. 
Because guerrillas understand and accept terrain and climate as their natural 
environment, they possess an unmatched tactical mobility on difficult ground.  Moving 
with astounding speed and ease, guerrilla forces routinely use routes and traverse areas 
considered impassable by regular troops. 
Mastery of the environment and the attitude of self-reliance give guerrilla units 
unusual versatility.  Guerrilla units adapt quickly from one environment to another or 
from one type of operation to another.  Holding a hilltop as a base one-day, they may be 
ordered to conduct a deep raid, mount a long-term reconnaissance patrol, participate in an 
ambush, or attack a fortified position on the next day.  Their versatility is also reflected in 
a propensity for improvisation and innovation.  Guerrilla forces naturally derive new 
tactics, if necessary, because they are not tied dogmatically to a specific doctrine.  They 
use their equipment in innovative ways, without hesitating to use their enemy’s weapons 
and resources when possible.  Guerrillas also remain open to new ideas, new technology, 
and new weaponry.  Guerrilla forces maintain a flexible attitude toward the battlefield. 
 
G. THE TACTICS OF GUERRILLA FORCES 
Guerrilla forces tend to hide and rest during the day and to move and fight at 
night.  The vulnerability of guerrilla forces to enemy artillery and airpower forces them to 
use the cover of darkness for protection. 
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Guerrilla forces are best suited for offensive operations.  Undoubtedly, the very 
character of the guerrilla forces is to be offensively oriented, and to retain the initiative in 
combat.  Even when employed in an overall defensive strategy, a guerrilla unit constantly 
seeks opportunities to conduct offensive operations. 
Guerrilla operations are usually conducted at very close range.  Guerrilla forces 
normally do not seek to maximize the range of their weapons.  Instead, they seek to get 
close enough to the enemy to smell and hear them. 
The conventional tactics practiced by regular forces, significant combat support, 
massing of combat power, and large-unit maneuver do not work well for guerrilla forces. 
Instead, four main features characterize guerrilla tactics: surprise, shock, speed, and 
intelligence. 
Guerrilla units achieve surprise in both time and space through several means.  
Through superior field craft and domination of the terrain, guerrilla units approach enemy 
positions with animal- like stealth.  Moving at night, using every fold in the ground, 
exploiting every bit of concealment, and making no noise, guerrilla units frequently reach 
hand-grenade range of the enemy positions before they are detected.  Guerrilla units also 
attack from unexpected directions and from more than one direction when feasible.  
Through pre-attack reconnaissance, guerrilla leaders determine the weaknesses and gaps 
in enemy dispositions, which then become the objects of attacks.  Finally guerrilla forces 
vary the time and style of their operations.  Thus, the enemy is unable to predict their 
actions. 
Having achieved surprise, guerrilla forces shock the enemy with the speed and 
power of their attack.  Although lightly armed, guerrilla units can deliver a heavy volume 
of fire for short periods of time by massing all its weapons forward in coordinated, 
accurate fire.  The application of such heavy firepower, combined with rapid maneuver to 
the sides and rear of the enemy’s positions, creates a violent shock effect possibly leading 
to a quick victory.  
Guerrilla units also exploit speed in their operations.  To achieve speed, which is a 
function of superior individual and group tactical movement, a guerrilla unit relies on its 
intimate knowledge of the terrain, a high level of fitness, expert field craft, and the 
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capability to negotiate difficult ground.  By moving to an objective faster than its enemy 
thinks possible, guerrilla units can achieve surprise.  To execute surprise successfully, 
however, requires stealth.  While many units can only move rapidly if they make no 
attempt to conceal their movements, guerrilla units must accomplish stealth as well as 
speed if they want to be effective.  Therefore, guerrilla units keep to the tough terrain 
areas and seldom use roads or trails.  
Accurate, timely intelligence is vital to the success of guerrilla operations.  To be 
effective, guerrilla forces must know what the enemy is about, while keeping the enemy 
in the dark about their own intentions.  
Guerrilla units obtain tactical intelligence from a variety of sources.  Often times, 
the majority of their intelligence comes through comprehensive patrolling.  Guerrilla 
forces also utilize existing intelligence networks, rather than attempting to duplicate 
them.  Therefore, smooth coordination with civil and police intelligence is absolutely 
essential in low-intensity conflicts, particularly counter- insurgencies. 
The guerrilla forces also employ other local sources of information: guerrilla 
leaders use local guides, when necessary, in unfamiliar terrain.  Sensitivity to intelligence 
remains an imperative for guerrilla operations.  
In this chapter, an examination on six guerrilla battles from the 20th century, the 
fundamentals of guerrilla warfare, the tactics and the nature of guerrilla forces are 
provided with the intent to give the reader a better understanding of the essence of 
asymmetric war and the rules associated with it.  In the next chapter, an infiltration 
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III. SCENARIO AND MODEL DESCRIPTION 
“It's the unconquerable soul of man, and not the nature of the weapon he uses, 
that ensures victory.” 
US World War II General, George S. Patton 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter starts with the description of an infiltration scenario, which is 
developed based on personal experiences in Turkey.  There is a brief description of two 
additional scenarios, which have been developed for comparison purposes.  This chapter 
also discusses the model, MANA in depth and explains the design philosophy behind it.  
It additionally addresses why the model is needed; why it can be superior in certain 
aspects to detailed models, like JANUS or CAEN; what improvements make it different 
from other Agent Based Models, like ISAAC; and why the chosen parameters were 
explored in the analysis.  Appendix B provides additional details on MANA. 
 
B. INFILTRATION SCENARIOS 
 
1. Base-line Scenario 
This scenario is based on personal experiences in Turkey.  In September 1999, I 
was a platoon commander of a battalion stationed in one of the rural areas in the 
Southeast of Turkey.  We received a mission order from the battalion commander to form 
a tank-infantry platoon and to move immediately to the top of a nearby hill.  The 
platoon’s task was to take up a position on the hill and protect the area against any 
terrorist activities.  This location was very critical for both sides, because terrorists were 
using this territory as a passage from northern Iraq to Turkey.  From the peak, we could 
easily monitor and interdict the terrorists.  Consequently, we expected the terrorists to 
attempt sneaking into our base to damage assets, cause some casualties, and demolish our 
morale.  
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In the scenario, the Blue forces, which represent the friendly side, are composed 
of two tanks, two ACVs (Armored Combat Vehicle), and nine infantrymen.  The platoon 
commander positions vehicles and personnel to watch the area and to protect assets 
against terrorist activities.  To achieve this, the commander locates one tank up facing the 
North, the other tank down facing the South and one ACV right facing the East, and the 
other ACV left facing west while situating three infantry teams, each of which has three 
infantrymen, between the vehicles.  The commander takes control of the northern portion 
of the base while ordering the non-commissioned officer (NCO) to take charge of the 
southern area.  The Red forces, which represent terrorists, are composed of 11 guerrillas 
who are equipped with light infantry weapons.  Two of these terrorists form a 
reconnaissance team.  The remaining nine terrorists split into two infiltration teams, one 
from the South and the other from the East.  The Blue force has superiority over the Red 
force in terms of weapons, equipment, and firepower.  On the other hand, the Red side 
has the superiority in adapting to tough weather/terrain conditions, and in using surprise 
effectively. 
In this specific scenario, the Red side conducts reconnaissance patrols against the 
Blue side for a long period of time until the Red commander makes sure that the 
necessary information and intelligence has been gathered about the Blue side to initiate 
the operation.  This information gathering time can be extended from one week to one or 
two months.  The Red side does not want to take any risk when unsure about the success 
of the attack.  Therefore, the Red commander assigns two subordinates to watch the Blue 
base and observe every single activity the Blue force makes.  These terrorists collect 
information about the Blue vehicles and infantrymen positions, the method of conducting 
their missions, the time of their shifts, and their strengths and weaknesses. 
Once all of the needed information is collected, the Red commander commences 
the attack.  The Red recon team initiates heavy fire upon Blue assets to distract its 
attention to that area.  As soon as the Blue side reacts to the opponents’ fire, the Red side 
initiates infiltration.  The Red commander splits the forces into two groups and 
approaches the Blue base from two different directions.  The commander prefers not to 
engage the enemy until reaching the target, being Blue’s base and his critical assets--like 
command center, tanks, armored vehicles, etc.  Time is another critical issue for the Red 
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side, which doesn’t want to engage with the enemy for a long time, since engagement 
would probably cause many casualties and a failure of the mission.  As a result, the 
objectives of the Red side are to establish sudden and heavy fire on the Blue side, to 
move quickly toward the enemy base, to destroy the critical enemy assets using grenades, 
bazookas, etc., to disengage with the enemy, and to flee from the area as quickly as 
possible.  In contrast, the Blue side tries to suppress Red’s initial fire keeping all attention 
on their field of responsibility.  The Blue side tries to minimize friendly moves inside the 
base, to keep coordination and communication at the highest level, and to prevent the Red 
force from sneaking into the base.  
After this general summary of the scenario we can conclude that the Blue side is 
greater in number, technologically more advanced, and well trained.  Nevertheless, 
although the Red side is fewer in number and equipped with light weapons, their 
initiative, well-organized and informed approach, and quick reflexes keep them 
competitive.  The screenshot below is the base- line scenario.  This screenshot is best 
viewed in color. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Infiltration Scenario (base- line) developed for use with MANA 
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2. Scenario Two 
Scenario one was run with a different placement of the Blue agents.  In this 
scenario, Scenario two, the Blue vehicles move up to the North while Blue infantrymen 
move to the South.  There is no difference between the two scenarios in terms of any 
other parameter values.  All of the agents’ personalities and factor settings are assumed to 
be exactly the same in both scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Alternative Infiltration Scenario developed for scenario comparison. 
 
3. Scenario Three 
Scenario one was again modified, this time with three infiltration lanes for the 
Red side, instead of two.  In this scenario, the Red side uses another infiltration lane to 
sneak into the Blue base.  In addition to the teams coming from the South and East, a 
third team approaches the enemy base from the west.  Except for this third lane, there is 
no other change in any of the original parameter values. 
One of our goals is to compare the second and third scenarios with the first one to 
identify any significant difference between the scenarios and to observe which one has 
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fewer casualties.  This allows us to assess the effect of the Blue force’s disposition and 
the Red force’s tactics. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Alternative Infiltration Scenario developed for scenario comparison. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Following this experience of close combat, some questions emerged on the 
possible consequences of this skirmish.  Agent Based Models, such as MANA, provide a 
great opportunity to answer those questions.  The following are the questions that will be 
examined with MANA: 
1. Which configuration is tactically more efficient for the Blue side, in this 
specific scenario: positioning vehicles up to the North, and infantries down to 
the South, or locating the vehicles on the main directions, and infantries in 
between them?  
2. In infiltration operations, guerrilla forces use single or multiple lanes to 
approach and attack the enemy’s base.  Which one is tactically more 
reasonable, in this scenario, based on the success of the mission? 
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3. In this scenario, the Blue side obviously has a significant superiority over the 
Red side in terms of the number and the ability of agents.  How many agents 
are needed for the Red side to overcome this deficiency?  
4. In guerrilla warfare, the “men over weapon” concept steps forward in most of 
the situations.  What significance does the Red side’s personality changes 
(e.g., aggressiveness, cohesion, trust, fear, etc.), when engaging with the 
enemy, have on the outcome of the battle?  
5. In case of a skirmish, the key objective for both sides, which leads to the 
success of the operation, is the effective use of weapons.  What is the 
optimum number of targets to be assigned to each member of the Red 
reconnaissance team considering their firepower and fire range?  
6. Under fire suppression many infantrymen tend to hide and take shots at the 
enemy without aiming.  This kind of attitude leads to an increase in stealth 
and a decrease in sensor range.  What are the consequences of changing these 
parameters?  
7. Unit cohesion can be perceived as the bonding of members of a guerrilla force 
in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit 
and the mission.  Does unit cohesion have a significant affect on the outcome 
of the battle in a guerrilla-style war? 
 
D. OVERVIEW OF MANA 
The following sections taken primarily from MANA User’s Manual [Ref.1] 
describe the model and its features.  Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA) was 
developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency (DTA).  
· Map Aware  - Agents are aware of and respond to, not only their local 
surroundings and terrain, but also a collective registry of recorded 
battlefield activities. 
· Non-uniform – Not all agents move and behave in the same way. 
· Automata – Agents can react independently to events, using their own 
personalities.  
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E. THE NEED FOR MANA 
The history of physics has been characterized by the search for systems simple 
enough to be described with a high degree of accuracy by mathematical equations 
[Ref.1].  Isaac Newton’s laws of motion are an example.  Although extremely accurate at 
predicting, for instance, the path and distance traveled by a heavy projectile, the laws 
cannot in general be relied on in all circumstances.  If the projectile is light, it becomes 
subject to a far greater degree of viscous drag in the atmosphere, which makes the 
original calculations invalid.  These equations cannot, with complete generality, be 
simply or easily corrected for the action of the drag.  The reason is that the interaction 
between the viscous atmosphere and the projectile is just too complicated while 
depending on too many variables (particularly if the projectile is light and has irregular 
shape, like a feather), not to mention that the atmosphere itself is unpredictable and 
turbulent [Ref.1]. 
This simple example illustrates a powerful point: the world is far more 
complicated than Newton’s equations.  To this day, no set of equations exist that can with 
absolute certainty predict the evolution of many of phenomena seen in everyday life for 
any significant period into the future [Ref.1]. 
Therefore, to rely on models built “on a bedrock of physics” is deceptive.  It is a 
myth that a more detailed model is necessarily a better model, because it is impossible to 
capture accurately every aspect of nature.  In fact, the more detailed a model is, the more 
obscure its workings. This problem is compounded if the user is not the model designer 
[Ref.1]. 
The non- linear nature of equations describing many real world phenomena makes 
them extremely sensitive to initial conditions.  This means that even infinitesimal errors 
in describing the real world initial conditions may cause the model to make predictions 
that are almost uncorrelated with actual events [Ref.1].  Many circumstances occur in 
which events unfold with such sensitivity to initial conditions that predicting the outcome 
of a single event is impossible.  Although little can be done about this non-linearity, 
knowing when it arises can be critical [Ref.2].  Awareness of non- linearity helps 
identifying and avoiding possible problems.  Situations also arise in which a very small 
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change can dramatically alter the likely outcome.  In this case, efforts should be 
concentrated on the source and condition in which non- linearity may arise. 
Another concern of most military analysts is the intangibles associated with war.  
Predicting battlefield performance, an element of war, is most difficult to measure or 
count because it depends so heavily on human behavior [Ref.2].  Cohesion, discipline, 
leadership, motivation, trust, and fear are accepted as important factors of intangibles.  
Moreover, in the case of the important elements of guerrilla warfare, conventional 
equation-based or low-resolution models are incapable of directly modeling many 
important aspects of guerrilla warfare.  Studying the effects of non-linearity and 
intangibles, inherent in guerrilla warfare, on the outcome of the battle is where Agent-
based models (ABM) may be more effective than equation-based or low-resolution 
models. 
 
F. ENTER MANA 
MANA was designed for use as a scenario-exploring model.  It is intended to 
address a broad range of problems [Ref.1].  
MANA is based on two key ideas: 
· The behavior of the entities within a combat model (both friend and foe) is 
a critical component of the analysis of the possible outcomes. 
· Time is wasted on highly detailed models for determining force mix and 
combat effectiveness. 
The behavior of troops in any kind of scenario plays an important role.  However 
it is often overlooked by analysts because human nature is a mathematical intangible; just 
as is the weather.  As with many other intangibles in analytical combat models, these 
behaviors are often thrown away in favor of dwelling on infinitesimal details, often of 
little real importance to a given scenario [Ref.1]. 
It is precisely the aspects that are most difficult to describe which are of the 
greatest importance.  So much in war is intangible, and these intangibles are spoken about 
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so often it is impossible to ignore them [Ref.1].  (See Muzaffer Coban’s thesis [Ref.41] 
for a good example of this argument). 
 
G. REASONS FOR USING MANA 
MANA is not intended to describe every aspect of a military operation.  
Furthermore, there is no inbuilt “intelligence” which determines the plan the MANA 
entities are working towards [Ref.1].  When setting up any scenario in the model, one 
should be very cautious.  There must be a clear idea of which aspect of warfare the 
scenario is addressing, and what the entities are trying to do.  The non- linear nature of the 
model ensures that, regardless of the modeler’s presumption, a remarkably large number 
of outcomes are possible.  Such a range of outcomes is characteristic of complex adaptive 
systems, and occurs even with quite simple rules of behavior [Ref.1]. 
The limitations of MANA must also be noted.  The model is not designed to 
carefully examine formation fighting, for example.  Formations occur in MANA as much 
by accident as by design.  Furthermore the entities within MANA do not always behave 
in a sensible manner.  They often exhibit actions that might be described as “mistakes”.  
However, this is part of the point of MANA [Ref.1].  Exploring the different ways of 
doing things quite quickly is an option (due to the simplicity of the model), even if they 
are “imperfect”.  This is highly useful when asking about the kinds of formations that 
produce the best results and what the consequences are in making certain kinds of 
mistakes, without placing constraints upon ourselves [Ref.1]. 
 
H. CELLULAR AUTOMATON MODELS 
Descriptively, MANA is in a general class of models called Agent-Based Models 
(ABM).  ABMs have the characteristic of containing entities controlled by decision-
making algorithms.  Hence an ABM contains entities representing military units that 
make their own decisions, as opposed to the modeler explicitly determining their 
behavior in advance [Ref.1]. 
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The MANA model falls into a subset of cellular automaton (CA) models.  CA 
models have their origin in physics and biology.  These models are often called complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) because of the way the entities within them react with their 
surrounding [Ref.1].  Some properties of MANA and CAS combat models generally are 
· They exhibit “global” behavior, which “emerges” as a result of many local 
interactions. 
· They are an example of a process of feedback that is not present in 
“reductionist”, top-down models. 
· They cannot be analyzed by decomposition into simple independent parts. 
· Agents interact with each other in non- linear ways, and “adapt” to their 
local environment. 
The MANA model is an attempt to create a complex adaptive system for some 
important real-world factors of combat such as [Ref.1] 
· Change of plans due to the evolving battle. 
· The influence of situational awareness when deciding an action. 
· The importance of sensors and how to efficiently use them. 
· The effects of intangible personality factors, like fear and aggression. 
 
I. DIFFERENCES FROM OTHER AGENT-BASED COMBAT MODELS 
The MANA model builds on and complements the earlier ISAAC/EINSTEIN CA 
models developed by the Center for Naval Analyses, and the more recent but still 
incomplete, Archimedes model being designed for the US Marine Corps [Ref.1]. 
The primary use of MANA is as a “distillation” tool: creating a bottom-up 
abstraction of a scenario that captures just the essence of a situation, while avoiding 
unessential detail.  Additionally, MANA was designed to explore key concepts that 
ISAAC (at that time) was unable to explore [Ref.1], in particular 
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· Situational Awareness: Includes a group memory of enemy contacts 
(also the method MANA uses to simulate communications). 
· Terrain Map: Contains roads that agents can follow. 
· Waypoints: Defines a set of waypoints, not just an ultimate goal. 
· Event-driven personality changes: Identifies events, such as being shot 
at, taking a shot, reaching a waypoint, making enemy contact that can 
trigger a different personality set lasting for a certain time.  Personality 
changes include individuals or a whole squad. 
 
J. USES OF THE MODEL 
The MANA model explores the interaction of autonomous entities, referred to 
generally as automata or agents.  Agents are the entities that appear in the model.  For 
instance, in our scenario, Blue infantries, vehicles and Red guerrillas are referred to as 
agents in MANA.  Each entity has certain personality traits that drive it toward or away 
from other entities on the “battlefield”.  In MANA, agents have the ability to change their 
personality completely if certain events occur [Ref.1]. 
Parameters within MANA can be divided into three basic types.  The first, 
personality weightings, determine an automaton’s propensity to move towards friendly or 
enemy units, its waypoint, an easy terrain, and a final goal point. 
The second type, constraints, acts as conditional modifiers to this process.  The 
Cluster parameter “turns off” the automaton’s propensity to move towards friends above 
some maximum cluster size; the Advance parameter prevents an automaton from moving 
towards its objective without a minimum number of friendly units accompanying it.  The 
Combat parameter determines the minimum local numerical advantage that a group of 
automata require before approaching the enemy [Ref.1].  A final set of parameters 
describes the basic capabilities of automata, such as weapon range, sensor range, 
movement rate, single-shot kill probability, defensive factor, stealth, and the maximum 
number of simultaneous targets that can be engaged.  The automata also possess the 
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ability to communicate the position of enemy automata to other friendly automata.  With 
these simple parameters, a surprisingly wide set of behaviors can be induced [Ref.1]. 
The meanings and usage of the parameters are explained in Appendix B together 
with the Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) associated with them.  In the next section, only 
the parameters chosen for analysis purposes will be explained. 
 
K. ACTIVATED PARAMETERS 
In order to explore our research questions within the capabilities of MANA, we 
chose 22 parameters to vary for further analysis and development of our model.  This 
section gives a general description of those parameters and the reasons they were chosen.  
In essence, we would like to give the reader a better idea of these parameters and their 
connections with our scenario.  Prior to getting into the details of the parameters, we will 
review the reasons why we chose certain states for different agents.  The formatting for 
the following parameters is Squad / State / Parameter.  These are the states and the 
parameters chosen for different squads of the scenario: 
· Red Team / Enemy Contact: We selected “enemy contact” state for Red 
infiltration teams because it represents the situations of terrorists the best.  
All terrorists reflect the same behaviors as soon as the enemy enters their 
sensor range.  Moreover, this state of Red infiltration teams is the one that 
primarily affects the outcome.  
· Red Recon Team / Shot At: We chose “shot at” state for Red recon 
agents mainly because their mission is to fire upon the enemy base for a 
certain amount of time to assist the infiltration.  They are the ones who 
start the attack with their fires.  This state best describes these agents’ 
situation. 
· Blue Team / Taken Shot: We selected “taken shot” state for Blue agents 
mainly because they are the defending side in this specific scenario.  They 
are fired upon first and then they react to the fire. 
· Red Team / Number of agents: This parameter is chosen to find out the 
best size for Red teams in order to compromise their deficiency in terms of 
29 
number.  In the original scenario the Red force has 11 agents, but we want 
to investigate the size needed to turn the battle to the Red team’s favor. 
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / w1: This parameter controls agent’s 
propensity to move toward agents of same allegiance in the state of enemy 
contact.  We vary w1 parameter to see various effects of cohesion and 
proximity among agents. 
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / w2: This parameter controls agent’s 
propensity to move toward agents of enemy allegiance.  We vary w2 
parameter to see the effects of aggressiveness and fear of the agents.  
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / w3: This parameter controls agent’s 
propensity to move towards injured agents of same allegiance.  Since 
terrorists never want to leave their injured or dead friends behind, we 
wanted to identify what the pay off would be for such a tendency.  
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / w8: This parameter controls agent’s 
propensity to move toward enemies in the SA map, which are of threat 
level 1.  Since we set the threat levels of Blue infantrymen (excluding 
commanders) to 1, this parameter shows Red agent’s tendency to move 
toward Blue infantries.  In the real battle, the terrorists exhibited a 
tendency to move toward infantries.  This parameter is also an indication 
of aggressiveness and fear.  
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / w10: This parameter controls an agent’s 
propensity to move toward enemies in SA map, which are of threat level 
3.  Since we set the threat levels of Blue vehicles to 3, this parameter 
shows a Red agent’s tendency to move toward Blue vehicles.  In the real 
battle, the terrorists demonstrated a tendency to move away from vehicles.  
This parameter is also intended to be an indication of aggressiveness and 
fear. 
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / Stealth: This parameter shows the 
probability of the agent not being seen.  In infiltration operations this 
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factor is one of the most vital elements of the operation.  Infiltration teams 
always prefer to engage with the enemy at the closest distance available.  
Therefore, remaining invisible until they reach their target is important. 
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / Firepower: This is simply single shot kill 
probability.  Since terrorists have a disadvantage of firepower, efficiently 
using this firepower is very important. 
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / Combat Constraint: The combat 
constraint permits advancing toward the enemy only if a certain numerical 
advantage is met, i.e., the Red side outnumbers the Blue side by a number 
of agents.  This parameter also indicates how aggressive the Red agents 
are.  
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / Movement Range: This is the number of 
grids an agent can move per time-step.  In essence, this parameter 
indicates how quickly an agent can move in certain territory.  
· Red Team / Enemy Contact / Cluster Constraint: The cluster constraint 
is designed to prevent agents from clustering in groups larger than a 
specified size, determined by the value of this parameter.  Terrorists 
usually split into teams of two or three people.  This constraint is 
important in discovering whether or not this formation is the right way of 
approaching the enemy.  
· Red Recon Team / Shot At / Stealth: Critical to the terrorists’ safety is 
their ability to remain hidden since they will be the targets of initial Blue 
fires. 
· Red Recon Team / Shot At / Firepower: Since these terrorists initiate 
fire, their accuracy in shooting seems to be very critical for Red mission 
success.  
· Red Recon Team / Shot At / Sensor Range: An agent can identify any 
other agent or terrain within this number of cells.  Recon agents’ positions 
and proximity to enemy base are very decisive in the success of their 
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mission.  By improving this range the Recon team can collect more 
information about the Blue team and assist with the infiltration.  
· Red Recon Team / Shot At / Firing Range: An agent can shoot at any 
other agent within this number of cells.  The weapon selection for recon 
agents is also very important.  They want to fire upon all enemy agents in 
the base so that their fires distract and harass all Blue agents.  
· Red Recon Team / Shot At / Max Targets per Step: This determines the 
number of targets within both sensor and firing range that can be shot at in 
a single time step.  Since the Red team wants to distract all Blue agents’ 
attention towards the Recon team, this parameter is very critical.  By 
changing this parameter, we can influence the performance of recon team, 
as well as the fate of the infiltration.  
· Blue Infantry / Taken Shot / Stealth:  As mentioned in one of our 
research questions, in guerrilla type skirmishes, infantries tend to hide and 
shoot at the enemy without aiming at him.  By varying this parameter we 
are able to monitor this effect on the outcome. 
· Blue Infantry / Taken Shot / Firepower: The attitude explained in the 
previous paragraph would obviously decrease the agent’s probability of 
hitting and killing the enemy.  We will play with this parameter to see its 
consequences on the outcome.  
· Blue Infantry / Taken Shot / Sensor Range: The same effects are seen 
on the agent’s sensor range when hid ing and shooting aimlessly; therefore, 
our intention here by playing this parameter is the same with the previous 
two parameters.  
· Blue Infantry / Taken Shot / Firing Range: Since by hiding these agents 
are decreasing their weapons’ effective firing range, we want to observe 
this effect as well.  
· Blue Vehicles / Taken Shot / Sensor Range: Although the Blue vehicles 
have a better sensor range, they were unable to use it mostly due to terrain 
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conditions: area is much wooded and the slope is very high.  We hope to 
find certain patterns by playing with this parameter.  The changes on this 
parameter can be a consequence of better positioning of the vehicles or 
reducing the effects of bad terrain conditions.  
· Blue Vehicles / Taken Shot / Firing Range: Our intention by playing this 
parameter was the same as sensor range parameter of Blue vehicles.  
 
L. TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE MODEL 
In MANA, each agent’s artificial intelligence (AI) has been restricted as much as 
possible.  The emphasis is on modeling the interactions of many simple agents rather than 
generating sophisticated behavior for individual agents [Ref.1]. 
MANA was developed in the object-oriented programming language, “Delphi”.  
Agent based models are well suited to object-oriented development methods due to a 
tight correspondence of the entities to be modeled and the software objects.  An object-
oriented design also facilitates changing the model.  The model consists of a few, key 
classes (of objects), which are described below [Ref.1]:  
 
1. Battlefield Object 
The Battlefield object contains an overview of the rectangular grid that represents 
the battle space where the agents interact.  It has a map of the terrain and keeps track of 
the squads and all the agents.  This object is responsible for moving all the agents, for 
adjudicating combat between agents, and for recording progress data for model output 
(measures of effectiveness).  Additionally, it prevents agents from moving off the grid, 
into impassable terrain, or two agents occupying the same location.  At each time step the 
battlefield object decides on an order for agents to move and fire and then calls each 
agent object to move itself [Ref.1]. 
 
2. Squad Object 
The squad maintains a group of agents [Ref.1].  It also has a set of properties 
belonging to that squad that can be shared by the agents, such as 
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· A shared set of personalities that the squad agents can take on (and the 
events which trigger the personalities), 
· A situational awareness map of enemy contacts, and 
· Waypoints, which become the agent’s goals, one after the other. 
 
3. Agent Object 
The Agent object knows where it is, and what state it is in, and how to detect the 
environment, fire and move.  It has certain personality weightings to move toward or 
away from other objects.  This object has the ability to modify its personality if certain 




The most important action of an agent is to move.  The movement algorithm 
selects the gr id square within its movement range that most satisfies its desire to move 
towards some entities and away from others.  The current location is also an option, so 
the agent can stay put [Ref.1]. 
The movement algorithm consists of the following steps: 
· Consider all moves within the movement range of the agent, including 
staying in place. 
· Eliminate moves into locations containing other agents or impassable 
terrain. 
· Consider all the entities in range by deciding on the most appealing of the 
permissible moves, using personality weights that represent a desire to 
move toward or away from agents, the waypoints, terrain or contacts on 
the Situational Awareness map. 
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· Impose behavior modifiers that change the basic behavior (e.g. minimum 
distance to others, cluster constraints, and so on).  If a number of moves 
are nearly equal, then choose a move at random from the attractive moves. 
Local sensor information takes precedence over information available to the agent 
from the situational awareness map.  If an enemy is within sensor range, then the 
influence of the situational awareness is ignored [Ref.1]. 
 
a. The penalty calculation 
The penalty calculation finds the move with the least “penalty”.  Moves 
are possible to grid squares within “movement speed” squares of the cur rent location, 
which are not already occupied by an agent or impassable terrain [Ref.1]. 
If several moves have a similarly low penalty, a move is chosen at random 
from the good moves.  The “movement precision” parameter sets how wide the margin 
should be for accepting similarly good moves.  Setting the movement precision to a low 
value means that only the best move will likely be chosen and the movement will appear 
very deterministic.  If the movement precision is too great, the agents tend to wander 
about in a Brownian motion, as moves are selected almost entirely at random [Ref.1].  
The tendency to move toward or away from an entity is constant with 
distance.  For example, the weighting to move towards the next waypoint is the same 
whether the entity is three cells or 150 cells away from it.  The penalty for moving to any 
grid location is the sum of 10 penalty calculations, corresponding to the 10 personality 
parameters listed in Table 9 in Appendix B. 
The algorithm used to calculate the penalty for a collection of entities 
within sensor range is the same for all 10 components [Ref.1].  The general algorithm for 
calculating the penalty component associated with a candidate move is shown in Figure 
4. The important term in the algorithm is (NewDist + (100 - OldDist)) / 100. 
This treats all entities as if they are about 100 units away.  If NewDist < 
OldDist and a move closer is desirable, the penalty term will end up slightly less than 1.0.  
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If NewDist < OldDist and a move away from the entity is desirable, a penalty term of 
slightly greater than 1.0 will result, i.e. there is a greater penalty [Ref.1]. 
 
Figure 5.   Penalty Calculation Algorithm 
The penalty for moving towards or away from other agents is normalized 
by the number of agents (the last line of Figure 4).  For example, if agents are attracted to 
friendly agents, they minimize their average distance to friendly agents within the sensor 
range.  However, a number of constraints can modify this attraction.  The minimum 
distance to friends/enemies range sets a radius to other agents, inside which the penalty is 
negated.  The check against minimum distance is made for every agent within sensor 
range.  If agents are within the minimum distance, their penalty is negated before adding 
to the sum for the friends’ penalty component [Ref.1]. 
 
Figure 6.   Penalty Calculation Diagram 
 
5. Random Numbers  
The random numbers generated in MANA are obtained using the built- in Delphi 
function “Random”.  Delphi uses a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) with a 
cycle of 232.  It maintains a 32 bit seed, which is treated as an unsigned integer.  The 
result can take on approximately 4.3 x 109 values (232) before repeating the cycle [Ref.1]. 
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When the MANA application is started, the Delphi function, Randomize, is called 
setting the random number generator with a random seed obtained from the system clock.  
This can be overridden by setting the seed manually via the multi-run dialog or in the 
Seed box on the main window [Ref.1].  
The Random function is used many times during the execution of the MANA 
model, for example in determining moving and firing order, in calculating stealth, in 
deciding the best of similarly good agent moves, in getting shot (SSKP), and in placing 
agents at the start of a run [Ref.1]. 
In the MANA source code, the Random function is normally called to return an 
integer number in a certain range.  A typical example would be the firepower calculation.  
In the agent “get shot” function, a random number between 0 and 100 is calculated.  If 
this number is less than the SSKP (an integer between 0 and 100) of the enemy agent 
who shot, then the receiving agent is hit.  As one would expect, a high SSKP (close to 
100) results in receiving agents being shot most of the time [Ref.1]. 
In this chapter the scenarios, the model and the parameters were described in 
detail.  In the next chapter, analysis tools and techniques to explore the model and 
scenarios with specified parameter settings will be explained.  Several statistical methods 
and packages will be used for the analysis.  We will look at these tools and discuss the 
approaches used to explore and exploit the data. 
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IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
“To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.”  
Sun-Tzu 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains the analysis methodology, designs and statistical tools used 
to explore small-unit guerrilla warfare in MANA.  Our objectives are to develop 
descriptive and predictive models for the data, to display the data using visual techniques, 
and to find reasonable and plausible answers to our research questions.  In this chapter, 
the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and statistical designs used to evaluate the 
significance of the parameters in MANA are explained.  This chapter also explains the 
statistical tools and the statistical techniques used in assessing the differences between 
scenarios, and the significance of the MANA parameters.  In our analysis, we developed 
many different models using several statistical techniques.  The reason for this is to 
compare these techniques and assess their descriptive, predictive and visual strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The analytical features in the current version of MANA are designed only for 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) based on the number of casualties at the end of a run.  
Therefore, in this study, two MOEs are used to examine the success of the mission for 
both sides and provide some insight into the seven basic research questions discussed in 
the previous chapter.  The first MOE is the proportion of Red MANA agents killed while 






1. Proportion of Red Agents Killed (MOE 1) 
Undoubtedly, the most important objective of a guerrilla operation is maximizing 
the enemy losses while minimizing the friendly losses.  Hence, the number of agents 
killed is always a critical factor when evaluating mission success.  
Proportions of Red agents killed are used instead of actual values.  The reason for 
this is that one of the 22 parameters chosen is the number of Red agents.  Since the 
number of Red agents changes and takes different values in each run we realized that 
taking the actual values of Red agents killed may give misleading conclusions.  
Therefore, the number of Red agents killed is divided by the number of Red agents in 
each run with these proportions being used as one of our MOEs.  
This MOE is used to explore all the questions at hand.  First, it is used to compare 
the alternative scenarios to the base- line scenario.  Sign Tests are completed based on the 
values of this variable.  Then, the MOE is used to determine the statistical significance of 
the chosen 22 MANA parameters (for a complete list of these factors and their ranges see 
Appendix E).  Although this MOE is considered in all 22 parameters, some parameters 
are more closely related to this MOE than others.  The number of Red agents, Red team 
w1, Red team w2, Red team w3, Red team w8, Red team w10, Blue infantry firepower, 
Red team stealth, Recon team stealth, Blue infantry sensor range, Blue infantry firing 
range, Blue vehicles sensor range, Blue vehicles firing range, Red team combat 
constraint, Red team movement range, and Red team cluster constraint are the parameters 
that were specifically chosen to see their effects on MOE1.  See Appendix E and Chapter 
III for more details. 
 
2. Proportion of Blue Agents Killed (MOE 2) 
In order to be consistent with MOE1, this MOE is chosen to be a proportion of the 
actual values as well.  This MOE is also used to explore all of the research questions.  It 
is used for comparison purposes between scenarios.  A second set of Sign Tests is 
accomplished for the proportion of Blue agents killed.  The significance of the 22 
parameters is determined, for the second time, based on the values of Blue agents killed.  
As mentioned earlier for MOE1, MOE2 is also believed to have connections with all 22 
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parameters.  However, these connections are stronger for some parameters; such as the 
number of Red agents, the Blue infantry stealth, the Recon stealth, the Recon firepower, 
the Red team stealth, the Red team firepower, the Recon sensor range, the Recon firing 
range, the Recon max targets per step, and the Red team combat constraint. 
 
C. LATIN HYPERCUBE DESIGNS 
When several factors are to be studied collectively, an experimental design is 
necessary to compare those variables.  Experimental design is an efficient way to 
estimate the effects of several factors simultaneously.  An experiment with at least one 
observation for every possible combination of levels is referred to as a complete layout 
(or full factorial design) [Ref.30].  If the number of factors is too many, like in our data 
set (22 factors), studying the effects of these factors with even two levels is a very 
challenging task.  For instance, if we want to have a full factorial design with all the main 
effects and interaction terms then we need 222 (4,194,304) runs to obtain one data point 
for each of the possible combinations.  Even this number, without considering 
replications, takes a significant amount of computer time to be run.  Assuming we want 
to use a half- fraction fractional factorial design instead of a full factorial design, we need 
222-1 (2,097,152) runs.  After taking into account the replications (say the Central Limit 
Theorem thumb rule of at least 30), the resulting number is frequently either impractical 
because of cost, time, or space constraints, or literally impossible.  
Furthermore, it is impossible to capture non-linearity with only two levels of each 
factor.  A better space filling design with many levels of the factors is required to capture 
non- linearity well.  For these reasons Latin Hypercube Designs were chosen.  
Latin Hypercube sampling (LHS) was developed by W. J. Conover of Texas Tech 
University.  His primary intention was to develop a method for improving the efficiency 
of simple Monte Carlo sampling.  This sampling method can be thought of as stratified 
Monte Carlo sampling [Ref.32].  
The method, LHS, uses a stratified sampling scheme to improve the coverage of 
the input space [Ref.33].  It selects n different values from each of k variables X1…Xk in 
the following manner.  The range of each variable is divided into n non-overlapping 
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intervals on the basis of equal probability.  One value from each interval is selected at 
random (or by a fixed method, such as the median) with respect to the probability density 
in the interval.  The n values obtained for X1 are paired in a random manner (equally 
likely combinations) with the n values of X2.  These n pairs are combined in a random 
manner with the n-values of X3 to form n triplets and so on, until n k-tuplets are formed.  
This sample (or any random sample of size n) is easily imagined as forming a (n x k) 
matrix of input values where ith row contains the specific values of each of the k input 
variables used on the ith run of the computer model [Ref.33].  
To fully appreciate the value of the underlying structure of LHS, it is helpful to be 
familiar with computer models used in actual applications [Ref.32].  Such models are 
usually characterized by a large number of input variables, and usually only a handful of 
these inputs are important for a given response.  In addition, the model response is 
frequently multivariate and time dependent.  If the input values were based on a factorial 
design, each level of each factor would be repeated many times.  Moreover, the 
experimenter usually has a particular response in mind when constructing the factorial 
design; this design may be totally ineffective with multiple responses [Ref.32]. 
On the other hand, LHS ensures that the entire range of each input variable is 
completely covered regardless of which single variable or combination of variables might 
dominate the computer model response(s) [Ref.32].  By sampling the entire range, each 
variable has the opportunity to show up as important, if it indeed is important.  
Also LHS is more efficient than simple random sampling in a large range of 
conditions [Ref.32].  The most basic method of collecting and monitoring data is simple 
random sampling.  With this design, samples are selected randomly and with equal 
probability.  While this method is easy to implement, a variety of sampling designs can 
be more efficient.  One of those designs is LHS, which produces estimates with smaller 
standard errors for the same sampling effort, or requires fewer samples to obtain the same 
standard error possibly obtained with simple random sampling.  Finally, the LHS method 
can cope with many input variables and is computationally cheap to generate. 
A Latin Hypercube Design (LHD) has a few distinctive features that are desirable 
for many real- life problems: 
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· It provides more information in the interior of a design space. 
· It provides a uniform random sampling while treating every design 
variable as equally important ensuring a uniformly distributed sampling in 
a given design space. 
· The sample size is controllable.  The designer, who is usually constrained 
by the budget, time, or other conditions, determines the sample size.  
 
D. ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE DESIGNS 
For the exploratory analysis to be implemented in this thesis, we used Lieutenant 
Colonel (LTC) Tom Cioppa’s recently developed near orthogonal LHDs.  These designs 
were selected as the most appropriate designs for our analysis.  The details and a 
discussion of all the properties of these designs can be seen in Cioppa [Ref.43]. 
LTC Cioppa developed four sets of 22-factor designs with 129 runs in the first set 
and 128 runs in the remaining three sets.  Note that these runs also correspond to the 
ranges of the factors.  These designs ensure that there is extremely little multi-collinearity 
across the columns (factors in main effects).  In other words, the designs are nearly 
orthogonal.  These designs also have good space-filling properties. 
After taking the designs, we modified them by inserting our parameters with their 
ranges.  For some of the parameters (Red number of agents, Max targets per step, combat 
constraint, and cluster constraint) the range of 129 was illogical.  Because of this, we re-
scaled them (allowing some duplicates) so that they take reasonable values while 129 
runs are evenly distributed within these values.  A complete list of these factors and their 
ranges can be seen in Appendix E. 
 
E. 36-1 FRACTIONAL FACTORIAL DESIGNS 
After exploring the data visually and completing the correlation analysis and 
several regression models, six of the 22 factors noticeably stood out as playing an 
important role in predicting response variables (MOEs).  Upon this discovery, we decided 
to do a further analysis of these variables.  Since the computational capabilities of 
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factorial designs can handle this size of a problem with only six factors, we used factorial 
designs.  Moreover, since we are primarily interested in main effects and two-term 
interactions, rather than all possible interactions, fractional factorial designs are used. 
However, in factorial experiments, three levels per factor are needed to detect 
non- linear responses.  When the number of factors is large, even a single replicate of a 3n 
full factorial design can be expensive and time-consuming [Ref.30].  For instance, one 
replicate of a 36 factorial experiment requires 729 runs.  It is often true that at some point 
higher order interactions tend to become negligible and can be properly disregarded.  An 
appealing strategy in such situations is to make runs for only a fraction of these runs.  
Provided that care be exercised when choosing factor settings in each run, a great deal of 
information about factor effects can still be obtained [Ref.30]. 
At this point we decided to utilize a 36-1 fractional factorial design, (1/3) of the 
possible 36 runs.  Our design is a resolution V design.  A resolution V design is one that 
does not confound main effects and two-factor interactions with each other, but does 
confound two-factor interactions with three-factor and higher interactions.  See [Ref.31] 
for more details on generating a 36-1 fractional factorial design of resolution V. 
 
F. DATA COLLECTION 
Today’s advances in agent-based models provide the potential to capture some of 
the adaptability and other key factors inherent in conflict.  However, to explore even a 
single question of interest, a couple of data points are often insufficient based on the 
landscape of possible outcomes within a given scenario.  Thus, in order to gain insight 
into questions at hand, producing thousands, hundreds of thousands, or even millions of 
data points is beneficial [Ref.2]. 
Initially, all three scenarios (see Chapter III for detailed information on these 
scenarios) were run thousands of times in MANA to explore how appropriately the model 
represents the real world experience of the author.  The secondary intention also was to 
see the effects of varying parameters on the outcomes of the scenarios.  After these 
preliminary runs, we noticed that two of the original parameters chosen did not affect the 
outcome as much as the others.  As a result of these initial runs, these two parameters 
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were discarded before the main runs started.  Then three scenarios, together with the 
designs, the model and the parameters, were submitted to powerful computing resources 
put together to support the Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s (MCCDC) 
processing needs. 
As previously stated, we had 22 factors with 129 levels along with three scenarios 
and four designs.  We also wanted to have 100 replications for each run.  Putting these 
together, the total number of runs is 
900,151)(100*)(513*)(3 =nsreplicatiorunsscenarios  
In order to produce the required amount of runs, the Marine Corps’ computational 
capabilities were used.  The Marine Corps fielded a cluster of eight Windows NT 
workstations, each with two processors.  This cluster of workstations, termed 
“Gilgamesh”, provides the Marine Corps with an in-house “supercomputer”.  Housed at 
Studies and Analysis, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 
Gilgamesh provides the ability to run MANA scenarios over 100,000 times in 24 hours 
[Ref.2]. 
Gilgamesh completed the 151,900 runs in three days, providing us with the results 
associated with each set of runs as well as means and quartiles of 100 replications of each 
run.  After further analyzing the factors and determining the most important six factors in 
Scenario one, a second set of runs was submitted to the supercomputer.  This time the 
base-line scenario, the fractional factorial design, the model, and the parameters of 
interest were sent over.  The total number of runs this time was 
300,24100*)(243 =runs  








G. DATA SETS 
For the analysis and model development purposes, two data sets are used.  The 
first data set is the result of Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube Designs on the base- line 
scenario.  This data set contains 51,300 runs and 24 columns.  The second data set is the 
result of the Fractional Factorial Designs on the base-line scenario.  This data set includes 
24,300 rows and 8 columns.  In both data sets two of the columns are the response 
variables or MOEs and the remaining columns are predictor variables.  From now on, the 
first data set will be referred to as 22-factor Data Set and the second data set will be 
referred to as 6-factor Data Set. 
 
H. COMPARISONS BETWEEN SCENARIOS 
 
1. Two-Sample Paired Sign Tests  
The first two research questions of interest cover the differences between the 
base-line and two alternative scenarios.  The focus is whether a significant difference 
exists between the scenarios.  In essence, we want to compare the base- line scenario with 
the second and, then, the third scenario.  One easy way of making these comparisons is to 
use the sign test.  The sign test often involves the use of matched pairs.  It is designed to 
test a hypothesis that one random variable in a pair tends to be larger than the other 
random variable in the pair.  Specifically, if, for i = 1, 2, …, n, Xi and Yi are paired 
random variables with Di = Xi - Yi, the sign test tests the hypothesis that the median of Di, 
mD, is equal to zero.   The test statistic (T) used is the number of positive differences.  If 
the null hypothesis is true, then the numbers of positive and negative differences should 
be approximately the same, i.e., T should be close to n/2.  In this study, the Analyse-It 
software for Excel is used to perform the sign tests. 
In order to construct our test statistics, we now need to identify the null and 
alternative hypotheses.  Under Ho, T is binomially distributed, with parameters n and .5: 
· Null hypothesis:  0 : 0DH m =  
 
· Alternative hypothesis: : 0a DH m ¹  
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· Level of significance:  05.0=a  
One way to report the result of a hypothesis test is to simply say whether the null 
hypothesis was rejected at a specified level of significance.  A more informative way to 
represent this notion of rejection or acceptance is to give the P-value.  The P-value is the 
smallest level of significance at which Ho would be rejected when a specified test is used 
on a given data set.  Once the P-value has been determined, the conclusion at any 
particular level a results when comparing the P-value to a [Ref.30]: 
· valueP a- £ Þ  Reject Ho at levela . 
 
· value > P a- Þ  Do not reject Ho at levela . 
 
I. STATISTICAL TOOLS USED IN THIS STUDY 
 
1. S-PLUS 
S-PLUS is a statistical software package to do data analysis and technical 
graphing.  It provides the analysts with the ability to manipulate the data, to graph it and 
to perform several statistical tests [Ref.20].  In a typical S-PLUS session, the following 
can be done: 
· Import data from virtually any source. 
· View and edit data in a convenient data window. 
· Create plots with the click of a button. 
· Control the details of graphics and produce output for export to the report 
document. 
· Perform statistical analyses from convenient dialogs in the menu system. 
· Run analysis functions one at a time at the command line. 
· Create individual functions. 




2. Clementine  
Clementine is a data mining application.  Data mining offers a strategic approach 
to finding useful relationships in large data sets.  In contrast to more traditional statistical 
methods, we do not necessarily need to know what we are looking for when starting.  
Data can be explored, fitting different models and investigating different relationships, 
until useful information about it is found.  The Clementine interface makes data 
exploration easy.  The interface uses an approach called visual programming.  Various 
nodes in the workspace represent different objects and actions.  The user connects the 
nodes to form streams, which, when executed, let the user visualize relationships and 
draw conclusions.  Streams are like scripts: the user can save them and reuse them with 
different data files [Ref.23].  In this thesis, Clustering Analysis and Neural Networks are 
done using Clementine. 
 
3. Netica 
Netica is an application for working with Bayesian belief networks and influence 
diagrams.  It contains functions to build, learn, modify, transform, save and read 
networks, as well as having a powerful inference engine [Ref.21].  Characteristics of 
Netica are 
· It has operations to build and modify networks in memory, as well as to 
save them to file and read them back. 
· It can solve decision networks to find optimal sequences of decisions and 
conditional plans. 
· It can learn probabilistic relations from data. 
· It can learn from experience using networks, which are being queried to 
do probabilistic inference. 
· It can reverse individual links (while maintaining the same joint 
probability distribution) and "sum out" nodes of an influence diagram or 
belief net. 
· It can save individual cases to file, and manipulate files of cases. 
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· It can perform sampling (discrete simulation) to generate random cases 
with a probability distribution matching the belief network. 
· It has nodes and networks with a "user-settable/readable" field, which can 
contain a pointer to anything chosen.  
Netica is used for exploratory analysis of the data.  It provides visual relational 
representation of the data.  Additionally, it is used to construct a predictive model and 
answer research questions. 
 
4. Multiple Additive Regression Trees (MART) 
Multiple Additive Regression Trees, MART, is a methodology for predictive data 
mining [Ref.25] that is usable with S-PLUS as an enhancement to it, especially in 
regression tree methods.  In this study, MART is used to develop a model for 22-factor 
Data Set together with regular regression tree techniques, which are built in S-PLUS. 
 
5. GGobi 
The GGobi software is a data visualization system with “state-of-the-art” 
interactive and dynamic methods for the manipulation of views of data [Ref.24].  It has 
the same graphical functionality whether it is running standalone or embedded in other 
software.  That functionality includes 2-D displays of projections of points and edges in 
high-dimensional spaces, as well as scatter-plot matrices, parallel coordinate and time 
series plots.  Projection tools include average shifted histograms of single variables, plots 
of pairs of variables, and grand tours of multiple variables.  Views of the data can be 
reshaped.  Several displays can be open simultaneously and linked for labeling and 
brushing.  Missing data are accommodated and their patterns can be examined [Ref.24].  
In our analysis, GGobi is used extensively for visualizing both data sets. 
 
J. DATA VISUALIZATION 
Visual methods have a special place in data exploration because of the power of 
the human eye/brain to detect structures.  These methods are important because they are 
ideal for sifting through data to find unexpected relationships [Ref.29]. 
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1. Tools for Displaying Single Variables 
One of the most basic displays for viewing a single response variable is the 
histogram, showing the number of values of the variable that lie in consecutive intervals.  
In large data sets, especially, the histogram can reveal real aspects of the underlying 
distribution of that single variable of interest [Ref.29].  In our analysis, S-Plus generated 
histograms are used. 
It is often desirable to display different groups of results on a single response 
variable separately so that the groups may be compared.  In such cases, a useful 
alternative display is the boxplot.  Boxplots contain a box with the bulk of the data, for 
example, the interval between the first and third quartiles.  A line across this box 
indicates the median of the data [Ref.29].  In this analysis, S-Plus generated boxplots of 
the data are used to demonstrate the difference between scenarios in terms of MOEs. 
 
2. Tools for Displaying Relationships between Two Variables 
Scatter and line plots are the most basic kinds of plots for displaying data.  They 
can be used to plot a single column of data or to plot one data column against another. 
The scatter plot is a standard tool for displaying two variables at a time.  Scatter 
plots are similar to line graphs in that they use horizontal and vertical axes to plot data 
points.  However, they have a very specific purpose.  Scatter plots show how much one 
variable is affected by another variable.  In other words, they represent how much two 
variables are correlated with each other [Ref.29]. 
 
3. Tools for Displaying More Than Two Variables 
Scatter plots can also be combined in multiple plots per page to help understand 
higher- level structure in data sets with more than two variables.  This set of plots is called 
scatter plot matrix.  One limitation of the scatter plot matrix is that it cannot show 
interaction effects with another variable.  At this point, conditioning plots, also known as 
Trellis plots, are very useful.  A Trellis plot is a plot of two variables that are conditional 
on the value of a third variable, called as conditioning variable.  Bar charts and surface 
plots are also used for visualization of the data sets.  Bar charts represent a requested 
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statistic based on the values of one or more variables.  They are useful for displaying 
exact magnitudes and emphasizing differences among the charted values.  Surface plots 
are three-dimensional surfaces reflecting the value of a variable over different values of 
two other variables. 
 
K. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. Descriptive and Predictive Modeling 
Before elaborating further on various analysis tools and techniques used in this 
study, we want to clarify what the terms model, pattern, descriptive modeling and 
predictive modeling mean.  A model is a high- level description, summarizing a large 
collection of data and describing its important features.  Often a model is global in the 
sense that it applies to all points in the measurement space.  In contrast, a pattern is a 
local description, applying to some subset of the measurement space, perhaps showing 
how just a few data points behave or characterizing some persistent but unusual structure 
within the data [Ref.29]. 
A descriptive model presents, in convenient form, the main features of the data.  It 
is essentially a summary of the data, permitting the study of the most important aspects of 
the data while perhaps providing the patterns associated with the variables [Ref.29]. 
On the other hand, the purpose of a predictive model is to estimate one or more 
dependent variables as accurately as possible from a set of independent variables.  One 
way to do this is to fit the model to data.  Data used to build such models usually come 
from closely monitored training sets.  The variable to be predicted and its covariates are 
carefully measured to build a training data set.  After training, the fitted model must be 
validated with a test set, a set of data outside the training set that gives a way to measure 
the model's ability to generalize what it has learned [Ref.29]. 
In this study, the focus is on understanding the data and developing a plausible 
model than can be used to predict future data.  In essence, both descriptive and predictive 
modeling techniques are required.  In order to summarize the data and study the most 
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important characteristics of it, Cluster Analysis is used.  This method provided us the 
interesting patterns related to our response variables (MOEs). 
For predictive modeling a variety of analysis methods are used.  These methods 
are Bayesian Networks, Multi Adaptive Regression Trees (MART), Regression Trees, 
Neural Networks, and classical Multiple Regression Techniques.  For the 22-factor data 
set all the modeling techniques are used except Multiple Regression.  For the 6-factor 
data set all the techniques are applied.  In all of the predictive modeling methods, the data 
sets are split into training and test sets.  For these purposes, random sampling algorithms 
of statistical packages are used. 
 
2. Random Sampling 
In random sampling, each item or element of the population has an equal chance 
of being chosen at each draw.  A sample is random if the method for obtaining the sample 
meets the criterion of randomness.  The statistical packages, S-Plus and Clementine, used 
in this study, have their own algorithms for random sampling.  In S-Plus, random 
sampling can be done automatically by using a built in random sampling function.  In 
Clementine this can be accomplished by using several nodes.  For our analysis purposes, 
we selected 80 percent of the data as the training set and the remaining 20 percent as the 
test set.  These sets are created for all techniques except Neural Networks.  Neural 
Networks require smaller data sets to implement.  After many trials it was discovered that 
the largest data size with 22 predictors that Clementine’s Neural Networks can handle is 
around 10,000.  Therefore, instead of 80 percent, 20 percent of the 22-factor data set was 
randomly chosen as the training set and another 20 percent was chosen as the test set. 
 
3. Cluster Analysis (Clementine) 
Cluster analysis is basically decomposing or partitioning a data set into groups so 
that the points in one group are similar to each other and are as different as possible from 
the points in other groups.  The purpose of doing this analysis is to see whether the data is 
composed of natural subclasses [Ref.29].  We expect to discover something about the 
nature of the data.  Obviously, the clustering methods focus on the notion of distance.  As 
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far as these techniques are concerned, the concept of distance is more fundamental than 
the coordinates of the points.  In principle, to carry out a cluster analysis all that should 
be known is the set of inter-point distances [Ref.29].  For further details of Cluster 
Analysis used in this thesis see [Ref.23]. 
 
4. Multiple Additive Regression Trees (MART/S-Plus) 
A particular methodology for trying to solve prediction problems is MART.  In 
predictive modeling, the goal is to use the data to produce an accurate mapping over the 
response variable.  The notion of accuracy depends on the type of the response variable y 
in terms of the set values it can assume.  If y assumes numeric values, the problem is 
known as regression and lack of accuracy is defined in terms of a distance measure 
between the predicted value and the unknown true value of y [Ref.25].  Two common 
























In these equations, yi represents actual values and yi represents fitted values of the 
response variables.  The difference between them ii yy ˆ-  is called residual or error. 
Besides accuracy, the other primary goal of MART is robustness.  It tends to be 
resistant against moderate to heavy contamination by bad measurements (outliers) of the 
predictors and/or responses, missing values, and to the inclusion of potentially large 
numbers of irrelevant predictor variables that have little or no effect on the response 
[Ref.25].  Internally, MART randomly partitions the input data into a training data set 
and a complement test set.  Another advantage of MART is that it shows the estimated 
relative importance of each predictor variable in predicting the response based on the 
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current model.  Additionally, MART provides the dependence of the model on each 
factor by identifying the most relevant predictor variables.  See [Ref.25] for more details 
on MART and its applications. 
 
5. Netica Bayesian Networks (Netica) 
The graphical models that we have used to represent dependencies between data 
and parameters associated with the sampling model can be further used to describe 
directed associations among sets of variables.  When used this way, such models are 
known as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) [Ref.22].  A belief network, also known as a 
Bayesian network or probabilistic causal network, captures our assumed relations (which 
may be uncertain, or imprecise) between a set of variables that are relevant to some other 
variables.  They might be relevant because we will be able to observe them, because we 
need to know their value to take some action or report some result, or because they are 
intermediate or internal variables that help to express the relationships between the other 
variables [Ref.21].  For further discussion and details on BBNs see [Ref.21] and [Ref.22]. 
 
6. Neural Networks (Clementine) 
Neural networks are one of a class of highly parameterized statistical models that 
have attracted considerable attention in recent years.  The fact that Neural Networks are 
highly parameterized makes them very flexible, so that they can accurately model 
relatively small irregularities in functions.  On the other hand, such flexibility means 
there is a serious danger of over- fitting [Ref.29].  See [Ref.29] and [Ref.23] for more 
details on Neural Networks and its applications in Clementine. 
 
7. Regression Trees (S-Plus) 
Tree-based models provide an alternative to linear and additive models for 
regression problems and to linear and additive logistic models for classification problems.  
Tree models are fit by successively splitting the data to form homogeneous subsets.  The 
result is a hierarchical tree of decision rules useful for prediction or classification 
[Ref.20].  The basic principle of tree models is to partition the space spanned by the input 
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variables to maximize a score of class purity, meaning (roughly depending on the 
particular score chosen) that the majority of the points in each cell of the partition belong 
to one class.  Tree models have many attractive properties while being easy to understand 
and explain.  They can handle the mixed variables (continuous and integer, for instance) 
with ease since trees partition the space using binary tests, and they can predict the class 
value for a new case very quickly.  They are, also, very flexible, so that they can provide 
a powerful predictive tool [Ref.29].  See [Ref.20] and [Ref.29] for more details on 
Regression Tree models. 
 
8. Multiple Regression Techniques 
Regression is the standard technique for assessing how various predictors relate to 
a response.  These are the regression techniques considered in this study: 
· Linear regression: Predicting a continuous response as a linear function 
of predictors using a least-squares fitting criterion. 
· Generalized additive models: Predicting a general response as a sum of 
nonparametric smooth univariate functions of the predictors. 
 
a. Linear Regression 
Linear regression is used to describe the effect of continuous or 
categorical variables upon a continuous response.  It is by far the most common data-
based model building procedure.  The linear regression model assumes that the response 
is obtained by taking a specific linear combination of the predictors and adding random 
variation (error).  The error is assumed to have a Gaussian (normal) distribution with 
constant variance and to be independent of the predictor values [Ref.29].  Linear 
regression models can be effectively used to measure the effects of interactions as well as 






b. Generalized Additive Models (GAMs) 
Generalized additive models extend linear models and generalized linear 
models by flexibly modeling additive nonlinear relationships between the predictors and 
the response.  Whereas linear models assume that the response is linear in each predictor, 
additive models assume only that the response is affected by each predictor in a smooth 
way.  The response is modeled as a sum of smooth functions in the predictors, where the 
smooth functions are estimated automatically using smoothers.  The GAM suggests a 
possible curved relationship, which may more accurately reflect the progress of the 
condition [Ref.20]. 
GAMs are useful where  
· The goal is to obtain a final fit or to explore what types of variable 
transformations might be appropriate for use in a standard linear model; 
· The relationship between the variables is expected to be of a complex 
form, not easily fitted by standard linear or non- linear models;  
· No a priori reason for using a particular model exist; and 
· The data should suggest the appropriate functional form.  
See [Ref.35] for more details on GAMs.  In this chapter, the MOEs, the 
designs and the statistical techniques used in the analysis were explained in detail.  Data 
collection and data visualization methods were mentioned.  In the next chapter, the 




“The skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures 
their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy 
operations in the field. With his forces intact he disputes the mastery of the empire.” 
Sun-Tzu 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains the results of the statistical methods applied to the two 
different data sets (Latin Hypercube Design and Fractional Factorial Design) at hand.  
Each measure of effectiveness is examined while the data sets are explored to determine 
the significance of the parameters as well as the differences between scenarios.  Sign tests 
are used to determine whether there is a significant difference between scenarios in terms 
of MOEs.  Various visualization tools from several statistical packages (S-Plus, Ggobi, 
Netica) are used to build a better understanding about relationships between different 
variables.  Models are developed using some statistical tools (S-Plus, Netica, MART, 
Clementine) for descriptive and predictive analysis of the data sets.  Finally, the research 
questions discussed earlier are examined using these results. 
 
B. TWO-SAMPLE PAIRED SIGN TESTS 
Frequently the objective of a test procedure is to discover if there is a significant 
difference between population parameters of interest rather than to estimate these 
parameters [Ref.30].  A non-parametric method of accomplishing this statistical inference 
is called the sign test.  In this study, a series of sign tests are implemented to determine if 
there is a significant difference between the base- line and two alternative scenarios.  The 
averages of each 100 replications are taken from the data sets of each scenario.  The 
random differences Di, are then calculated for each of the 513 input combinations.  If 
there is no difference between the scenarios, then we expect the median of Di, mD, to be 
zero.  We use the sign test to test this. 
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· Null hypothesis:  0 : 0DH m =  
 
· Alternative hypothesis: : 0a DH m ¹  
 
· Level of significance:  05.0=a  
Under Ho, T is binomially distributed, with parameters n and .5.   
 
1. Sign Tests for Difference between Red Proportions  
Boxplots in Figure 7 show the differences between Scenarios.  In this plot, the y-
axis corresponds to the values of the differences while the x-axis represents the 
differences between scenarios.  The boxplot on the left, which is assigned to 1, 
corresponds to the difference between Scenario one and Scenario two.  The boxplot on 
the right corresponds to the difference between Scenario one and Scenario three.  These 
boxplots suggest that no significant difference exists between Scenario one and two 
whereas a significant difference exists between Scenario one and three in terms of the 
proportion of Red killed.  In other words, different formation of the Blue 
vehicles/infantry does not have an effect on the outcome of the battle while three- lane 
formation of Red does have a significant effect on the outcome in terms of Red 















Boxplot Comparison of Scenarios for Red Prop
 
Figure 7.   Boxplot for the comparison of the scenarios (MOE1) 
 
a. Scenario one and Scenario two 
Let’s assume m1 is the number of negative differences, that is the 
proportion of Red killed in Scenario one is greater than the proportion of Red killed in 
Scenario two, m2 is the number of positive differences, and m3 is the number of ties.  
Finally, n is the total number of positive and negative observations discarding the ties. 
1 235m =  T = 2 263m =   3 15m =  498n =  
0.226P value- =  
Since 263 » 235 and the P-value = 0.226, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis.  We conclude that there is no significant difference between these two 
scenarios in terms of Red casualties.  In other words, the different formation of the Blue 






b. Scenario one and Scenario three 
1 120m =  2 385m =  3 8m =   505n =  
0P value- =  
Since 385 >> 120 and the P-value = 0, we reject the null hypothesis.  We 
conclude that there is a significant difference between these two scenarios.  In other 
words, the third infiltration team of the Red agents has a significant effect on the number 
of Red agents killed; this formation increases the number of Red casualties. 
 
2. Sign Tests for Difference between Blue Proportions  
Boxplots in Figure 8 show the differences between Scenarios based on the 
proportion of Blue killed.  The boxplot on the left, which is assigned to 1, corresponds to 
the difference between Scenario one and Scenario two.  The boxplot on the right 
corresponds to the difference between Scenario one and Scenario three.  These boxplots 
suggest that a significant difference exists between Scenario one and two whereas no 
significant difference exists between Scenario one and three in terms of the proportion of 
Blue killed.  In other words, different formation of the Blue vehicles/infantry does have a 
significant effect on the number of Blue killed while three- lane formation of Red does not 
have an effect on the outcome in terms of Blue casualties.  The different formation of the 












Boxplot Comparison of Scenarios for Blue Prop
 
Figure 8.   Boxplot for the Comparison of the Scenarios (MOE2) 
 
a. Scenario one and Scenario two 
1 81m =  2 381m =  3 51m =  462n =  
0P value- =  
Since 381 >> 81 and the P-value = 0, we reject the null hypothesis.  We 
conclude that there is a significant difference between these two scenarios.  In other 
words, the different formation of the Blue vehicles and infantries has a significant effect 










b. Scenario one and Scenario three 
1 242m =  2 222m =  3 49m =  464n =  
0.378P value- =  
Since 242 » 222 and the P-value = 0.378, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis.  We conclude that there is no significant difference between these two 
scenarios.  In other words, the third infiltration team does not have a significant effect on 
the number of Blue agents killed. 
 
C. CLUSTER ANALYSIS IN CLEMENTINE 
Cluster Analysis is a good way of describing and searching for patterns in a data 
set.  For this reason, the clustering method in Clementine is used to examine the 
relationship between two MOEs, the proportion of Red killed and the proportion of Blue 
killed.  The goal is to find out which results lead to other results on the enemy side.  
Before using the clustering model, the values of MOEs in data sets are transformed from 
numerical values into categorical values.  As previously given, our MOEs take 
continuous values between 0 and 1.  We split these values into three categories of low, 
medium, and high, by defining some ranges.  For both MOEs, the values from 0 to 0.25 
are assigned a value of 0 (low), the values from 0.25 to 0.75 are assigned a value of 1 
(medium), and the values bigger than 0.75 are assigned a value of 2 (high). 
 
1. The 22-Factor Data Set  
 
a. Red Killed 
For the Red side, the proportion of Red killed takes a high value almost 85 
percent of the time.  That is Red gets good results in 15 percent of the runs.  In our further 
analysis, we will concentrate on the results where Blue has high or medium casualties 
and Red has medium or low casualties.  We will attempt to find the factors that are 
associated with these results.  The histogram of MOE1 (Figure 9) supports the results of 
cluster analysis. 
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Histogram of Red Prop for Big Data Set
85 %
 
Figure 9.   Histogram of MOE1 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
b. Blue Killed  
For MOE2 the results are in favor of Blue for most of the runs, because 
approximately 80 percent of the time Blue takes low casualties.  The clustering analysis 
suggests that we should focus on the cases where Blue has medium or high casualties, 
which are 19 percent and 1 percent respectively.  The histogram below also supports this 
analysis.  The runs where the blue casualties are medium are especially worth looking at 
closely since they occur in almost one of five cases. 
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Histogram of Blue Prop for Big Data Set
80 %
 
Figure 10.   Histogram of MOE2 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
 
c. Blue and Red Killed 
The primary goal of cluster analysis is to find the patterns between the two 
MOEs.  The data here is divided into five clusters based on the distances between the 
values of the MOEs.  In Cluster-1, 24 percent of the data, the Red side performs well by 
inflicting medium casualties on the Blue side while taking high casualties only 50 percent 
of the time.  In Cluster-2, 2 percent of the data, both sides take only low casualties.  In 
Cluster-3, 1 percent of the data, the Red team takes medium casualties while the Blue 
team takes low.  In Cluster-4, 1 percent of the data, the Blue team takes high casualties 
while the Red team also takes high casualties 74 percent of the time.  Finally, in Cluster-
5, 72 percent of the data, the Red force takes high casualties while the Blue force takes 
low casualties. 
Figure 11 shows these clusters and the relationships between MOEs.  This 
is a Trellis plot of our MOEs conditioned on five different clusters.  The y-axis represents 
the proportion of Red killed while the x-axis represents the proportion of Blue killed.  In 
this Trellis Plot, Cluster-1 and Cluster-4 suggest that Red is successful by inflicting 
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medium and high Blue casualties while suffering less high losses.  By looking at the 
parameter settings associated with Cluster-1 and Cluster-4 some patterns and 
relationships can be detected between predictor and response variables. 
 
















Cluster: 1 Cluster: 2




Figure 11.   Cluster Trellis Plot for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
 
Figure 12 gives a relational representation of how clusters are formed.  In 
this plot Cluster-1 is the highest point in the Cluster column and demonstrates an 
interesting pattern of good results for the Red side.  Also, Cluster-3 and Cluster-4 show 
important patterns for the analysis.  In these clusters, Red scores good results by taking 






Figure 12.   Parallel Coordinates Plot of Clusters for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
 
2. The 6-Factor Data Set 
 
a. Red Killed 
Cluster analysis is also applied to the 6-factor data set.  The values of 
MOE1 in this data set reveal an interesting pattern.  The medium values for the 
proportion of Red agents killed are almost never observed while the low and high values 
appear frequently depending on the settings of the predictor variables.  After a close look 
at the data, we detected that MOE1 takes values either below 0.2 or above 0.75.  The 
histogram below shows this situation more clearly. 
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Histogram of Red Prop for Small Data Set
70 %
 
Figure 13.   Histogram of MOE1 for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
 
b. Blue Killed 
Clustering of MOE2 provides three clusters associated with low, medium 
and high values of Blue killed.  These clusters also suggest that 75 percent of the time 
Blue takes low casualties.  However, this time Blue takes medium casualties more 
frequently, 24 percent of the cases, than the 22-factor data set.  This observation can be a 
result of a specific variable or variables in the 6-factor data set.  The histogram below 
also suggests that the parameters associated with the proportion of Blue killed values of 
0.5 to 0.75 should be explored. 
66 











Histogram of Blue Prop for Small Data Set
75 %
 
Figure 14.   Histogram of MOE2 for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
 
c. Blue and Red Killed 
When a cluster analysis is done on both MOEs, more interesting results 
and patterns are discovered.  For the 6-factor data set, five clusters are formed 
representing the relationships between MOE1 and MOE2.  According to Cluster-1, 69 
percent of the data, the Blue side does not lose many agents while inflicting high Red 
casualties.  Cluster-2, 20 percent of the data, suggests that the Red team usually takes low 
casualties while causing the Blue team high losses.  Cluster-3 and Cluster-4, only 1 
percent of the data, says that the Red team suffers low or medium casualties while 
imposing high losses on the Blue team.  Finally, Cluster-5, 10 percent of the data, shows 
that both sides suffer low casualties.  Figure 15 illustrates these clusters.  Cluster-2 and 
Cluster-4 seem to be very advantageous for the Red side with low friendly and high 
enemy losses.  The parameter settings associated with these clusters may reveal 
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Cluster: 3 Cluster: 4
Cluster: 5
Cluster Conditional Plot for Small Data Set
 
Figure 15.   Cluster Trellis Plot for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
Figure 16 demonstrates a relational structure of how clusters are formed.  
In this plot, Cluster-2 (second point from the top in Cluster column) shows a critical 
relationship between MOEs where the proportion of Red killed is usually low while the 
proportion of Blue killed is high.  This can be identified by looking at the lines coming 
from the Blue Prop and going into Cluster-2 through the Red Prop.  Higher Blue Prop 
values match with lower Red Prop values to form Cluster-2.  The other importance of this 




Figure 16.   Parallel Plot of Clusters for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
 
D. NEURAL NETWORK MODEL IN CLEMENTINE 
The first model built for predictive modeling is the Neural Network model.  For 
constructing this model Clementine is used.  Neural Networks adopt a basic idea of 
transforming a linear combination of the predictor variables via nonlinear transformations 
using multiple layers.  The model contains three layers, representing inputs, hidden layer, 
and outputs.  The Hidden layer is where all the linear combinations of the non-linear 
transformations of the predictor variables take place. 
 
1. The 22-Factor Data Set 
As previously given, the 22-factor data set has 51,300 rows, which is substantial.  
Since Clementine’s Neural Network does not work with huge data sets, 10 percent of the 
data is taken as a training set by using a random sampling (without replacement) 
algorithm in Clementine.  Another 10 percent of the remaining data is randomly assigned 
to be the test set.  Since we have 22 predictors, the input layer has 22 nodes.  The Hidden 
layer has eight nodes and the output layer has one. 
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a. Red Killed 
After training the data with the response variable, MOE1, the model 
provides us a mean absolute error of 0.0328 on the training set.  It also gives us the 
relative importance of the variables.  According to this model, the most important six 
variables for predicting Red casualties are the Red Stealth, the Red Movement, the Red 
Propensity to Enemy (w2), the Blue Infantry Firing, the Red Number of Agents, and the 
Red SSKP.  Since there is always a danger of over-fitting in Neural Network Models, test 
data is used to see the predictive power of this model.  The mean absolute error of the 
model on the test set is 0.0334, which is about the same as the training set error. 
 
b. Blue Killed 
The same type of Neural Network model for MOE2 results in a mean 
absolute error of 0.0477 on the training set.  According to this model, the most important 
six variables for predicting Blue casualties are the Red Stealth, the Red Number of 
Agents, the Red SSKP, the Recon Firing, the Recon Stealth, and the Red Combat.  Here 
note that the Red Stealth, the Red Number of Agents, and the Red SSKP parameters are 
involved in the previous model of MOE1.  The mean absolute error of the model on the 
test set is 0.0483, which is almost the same as the error of the training set. 
 
2. The 6-factor Data Set 
The 6-factor data set consists of 24,300 runs with 8 variables.  In order to use the 
whole data, 80 percent of the data is randomly chosen to be the training set while the 
remaining 20 percent is selected to be the test set.  In this Neural Network Model, the 
input layer has six nodes, the hidden layer has eight nodes and the output layer has one 
node. 
 
a. Red Killed 
When we consider MOE1, the model predicts the output with a mean 
absolute error of 0.0128 in the training set, which is smaller than the error obtained from 
the Neural Network model of the 22-factor data set.  The most important three variables 
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are the Red Stealth, the Recon Stealth, and the Number of Red Agents.  The prediction of 
the test set with this model gives us a mean absolute error of 0.013. 
 
b. Blue Killed 
For MOE2, the mean absolute error on the training set is 0.04, which is 
also smaller than the error obtained from the model of the 22-factor data set.  The most 
important three variables are the Red Stealth, the Red SSKP, and the Number of Red 
Agents.  Finally, the mean absolute error for the test set is 0.105. 
In conclusion, the Neural Network Model on the 22-factor data set gives us very 
small errors, which are also consistent with each other in the training and test sets.  
However, this model is very complicated with 22 input variables, especially when 
considering all the linear combinations of these variables in the hidden layer.  The model 
used for the 6-factor data set gives good predictive power for MOE1, but it does not do 
well on MOE2. 
 
E. THE REGRESSION TREE MODEL FOR THE 22-FACTOR DATA SET 
For the 22-factor data set, Regression Tree models supported by MART are used.  
The plots below showing the relative importance of the variables in the tree models are 
taken from MART and are incorporated in Regression Tree models of S-Plus. 
 
1. Red Killed 
In Figure 17, the y-axis represents the most important predictor variables and the 
x-axis represents the importance of these variables in the tree model.  One important 
observation in this plot is that the Red Movement parameter turns out to be the second 
most important parameter for MOE1.  Another interesting point is that the Red 




























Figure 17.   Relative Importance of the Variables for MOE1 in MART 
 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
"Red.Stealth" "Red.Movement" "Red.Num" 
"Recon.Stealth" 
Number of terminal nodes:  13  
Residual mean deviance:  0.006004 = 240.1 / 39990 
 
Table 1.   Regression Tree Model of MOE1 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
In this first tree model for MOE1, Table 1 shows we have 13 nodes, which means 
13 different results based on the values of parent variables.  Residual mean deviance is 
the sum of the squared values of residuals divided by total number of observations.  
Residuals are simply the differences between actual and predicted values.  Many tree 
models are searched to find the simplest and the most efficient model with the lowest 
mean deviance.  The residual mean deviance in this model is 0.006.  Comparing the 
variables used in this model with the most important four variables of the MART model 
indicates that these two models are fairly consistent with each other.  The residual mean 























Regression Tree for Red Prop
 
Figure 18.   Regression Tree Model of MOE1 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
These regression tree models seem quite reasonable with strong predictive power.  
They are also easy to interpret with a good visual representation of the model.  Reading 
the model is best illustrated by taking the first model in Figure 18 and following the 
reasoning step by step.  If the Red Stealth is greater than 123.5 and the Red Movement is 
less than 28 then the Red side takes around 88 percent casualties.  In other words given 
these conditions, no matter what values other parameters take the Red team takes high 
casualties. 
 
2. Blue Killed 
Figure 19 shows the important variables for MOE2.  When looking at the most 
important six parameters, four of them are the same as the most important parameters of 
the model of MOE1.  Another crucial finding is that all the important parameters are 
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Figure 19.   Relative Importance of the Variables for MOE2 in MART 
 
 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
"Red.Stealth"  "Red.Num"  "Recon.Stealth"   
"Recon.Firing"  "Recon.Sensor"  "Red.SSKP"  "Red.w1"  
Number of terminal nodes:  13  
Residual mean deviance:  0.0165 = 659.9 / 39990  
 
Table 2.   Regression Tree Model of MOE2 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
Table 2 illustrates that this model contains 13 nodes or leaves.  When the 
variables used in the tree model are compared with the important variables of the MART 
model, they are fairly consistent.  To measure the predictive power of this model, the test 
data set is used again.  The residual mean deviance of the tree model for the test set is 
0.016.  Finally, Figure 20 is our tree model of the proportion of Blue killed for the 22-

























Regression Tree for Blue Prop
 
Figure 20.   Regression Tree Model of MOE2 for the 22-factor Data Set  
 
In Figure 20, if the Red Stealth is less than 111.5, the Number of Red 
Agents is less than 24.5 and the Recon Stealth is less than 108.5, Blue takes very low 
casualties.  In other words, given these conditions no matter what values other parameters 
take, the Red team cannot cause any trouble for the Blue team.  The tree models 
developed for MOEs provide us very strong predictive power with simple and good 
visual representations.  One important observation is that the Red parameters are 
decisively important for both MOEs. 
 
F. NETICA BAYESIAN NETWORK MODELS 
Another model developed to predict the MOEs based on the values of predictor 
variables is the Bayesian Belief Network.  A belief network, also known as a Bayesian 
network or probabilistic causal network, captures our assumed relations (which may be 
uncertain, or imprecise) between a set of variables or nodes relevant to some other 
variables.  Probabilistic relations are provided for each node, which express the 
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probability of that node having different values conditioned on the values of its parent 
nodes.  Many preliminary models with different predictor variables and different model 
sizes are tested to locate a simple and an effective model with good predictive power.  
For both 22-factor and 6-factor data sets, all of the variables are transformed to 
categorical variables with three levels, namely low, medium and high.  This is 
accomplished by partitioning the values of the variables close to thirds.  The ranges of all 
variables can be seen in Appendix E.  The data sets also split into training and test sets.  
The training set consists of a randomly selected 80 percent of the data.  The test set 
includes the remaining portion of the data. 
 
1. The 22-factor Data Set 
After many trials of different networks with various model sizes, we realized that 
an eight-node model for the 22-factor data set is simple and effective enough to meet our 
demands. 
 
a. Red Killed 
Among the several models with eight nodes, we found the best one for 
MOE1 with the lowest prediction error rate.  Figure 21 demonstrates the nodes and the 
relational arcs between them.  The nodes in this Figure correspond to categorical 
variables whereas the arcs represent the dependencies between these variables.  In this 
figure only the parameters connected to MOE1 with arcs are used in the model.  The 
model works by inferring the values of response variable using the joint conditional 
probabilities between MOE1 and eight predictor variables.  For instance, given that all 
eight predictor variables are approximately uniformly distributed, as in Figure 21, the 






Bayesian Network Model of Red Killed 
 
Figure 21.   Bayesian Network Model of MOE1 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
 
The predictions are made using this model on the test set.  The 
misclassification error rate is 0.026.  Table 3 illustrates the predictions along with the 
actual values, the error rate and the variables used in the model. 
 
  .......Predicted...... 
     Low  Medium    High    Actual 
  ------  ------  ------    ------ 
     619      28       0    Low 
      20     848     152    Medium 
      23      67    9545    High 
 
Error rate = 2.566% 
 
Variables used in Model Construction 
 
Red Stealth    Red Propensity to enemy 
Red Combat     Infantry Sensor 
Recon Stealth    Red Movement 
Red Num Agents    Red Propensity to friends 
 
Table 3.   Bayesian Network Predictions of MOE1 for the 22-factor Data Set 
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b. Blue Killed 
For MOE2 the same approach as MOE1 is used to build the model.  The 
model in Figure 22 shows the network with nodes and arcs between nodes representing 
the relationships.  Here in this figure given that all eight predictor variables are 
approximately uniformly distributed Blue takes low casualties 38.7 percent of the time. 
 
Bayesian Network Model for Blue Killed 
 
Figure 22.   Bayesian Network Model of MOE2 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
After constructing the model, it is applied to the test set to see its 
predictive power.  The misclassification error rate is 0.056, which is the model 
misclassified MOE2 in 5.6% of the test data.  Table 4 shows the predictions against 
actual values and the variables used in model construction.  In the table, the variables 









     Low  Medium    High    Actual 
  ------  ------  ------    ------ 
    8179     210      10    Low 
     325    2423      19    Medium 
       5      65      66    High 
 
Error rate = 5.61% 
 
 
Variables used in Model Construction 
 
*Red Stealth    *Recon Stealth 
Recon Firing    Red SSKP 
*Red Propensity to friends  Recon Sensor 
*Red Num Agents    *Red Combat 
 
Table 4.   Bayesian Network Predictions of MOE2 for the 22-factor Data Set 
 
2. The 6-factor Data Set 
Since six predictor va riables exist in this data set all of them are used in the 
model.  The data set is divided into training and test sets.  The training set is used to build 
the model and the test set is used to test it. 
 
a. Red Killed 
The model for MOE1 is shown in Figure 23.  Apparently this model is 
fairly accurate in predicting the response with no error.  In other words, given the values 
of these six variables and their relationships with MOE1, this model can predict the 
values of the response with perfect accuracy.  As previously stated the model uses joint 
conditional probabilities between response and predictor variables to infer the values of 
the response variable.  This model suggests that all of the six variables are important in 






Bayesian Network Model for Red Killed 
 
Figure 23.   Bayesian Network Model of MOE1 for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
 
Table 5 illustrates the predicted and actual values, and the 
misclassification error rate.  As previously mentioned in this data set, the MOE1 takes 
either low or high values depending on different parameter settings.  The Bayesian 
Network model seems to work even more efficiently in such cases where medium values 




   Low  Medium    High    Actual 
  ------  ------  ------    ------ 
    1398       0       0    Low 
       0       0       0    Medium 
       0       0    2902    High 
 
Error rate = 0% 
 




b. Blue Killed 
The model for MOE2 is shown below in Figure 24.  The model learns the 
data using the training set and then uses probabilistic inference based on joint conditional 
probabilities to predict the values of response variable. 
Bayesian Network Model for Blue Killed 
 
Figure 24.   Bayesian Network Model of MOE2 for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
In Table 6 the model for the 6-factor data set does much better than the 
one for the 22-factor data set in predicting the response variable with only 0.027 
misclassification error rate. 
 
.......Predicted...... 
     Low  Medium    High    Actual 
  ------  ------  ------    ------ 
    3152      18       0    Low 
      82     991      13    Medium 
       0       3      41    High 
 
Error rate = 2.698% 
 
Table 6.   Bayesian Network Predictions of MOE2 for the 6-factor Data Set 
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G. REGRESSION MODELS FOR THE 6-FACTOR DATA SET 
Regression is the standard technique for assessing how various predictors relate to 
a response.  This method is used to construct models for the 6-factor data set.  Before 
building the model the data set is divided into training and test sets. 
 
1. The Linear Regression Model for the Proportion of Blue Killed 
Linear regression is used to describe the effect of continuous or categorical 
variables upon a continuous response.  The linear regression model assumes that the 
response is obtained by taking a specific linear combination of the predictors and adding 
random variation (error) [Ref.29].  For MOE2, many transformations are considered but 
the best transformation is finally discovered to be the square root of the proportion of 
Blue killed.  After this transformation, the StepAIC function is used to find the best linear 
model with main effects and two-term interactions.  The StepAIC function is a special 
search method to find the most important main effects and interaction terms.  It is usable 
in S-Plus by attaching library (Mass).  Table 7 shows us the main effects and interactions 
in this model along with their coefficient values, standard errors, t-values and p-values 
associated with these t-values.  Note that 12 two-term interactions appear in this model.  
For example, to predict the number of Blue killed in a certain situation, we take the value 
of main effects and interactions from the design and multiply them by their coefficients 
shown under the Value column.  These values are added up taking the square of the 
summation.  The signs of the coefficients of the factors are also worth looking at.  For 
instance, the value of the Red Stealth’s coefficient is (+0.0018) meaning that the number 
of Blue casualties increases as the Red Stealth increases.  The residual standard error in 
this table illustrates how variable the errors of the predictions created by this model are.  
Multiple R-Squared is a measure of how good the regression model is in explaining the 
data.  It shows how much of the total variation in the data can be explained by the 
regression model.  The F-statistic compares the model to the model that has only the 
intercept.  The null hypothesis is the terms except for the intercept do not help in 
predicting the response variables.  If the p-value is less than our level of significance, we 
reject the null hypothesis.  In order to see how powerful this model is when predicting 
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future data the test set tried.  The residual mean deviance is 0.0296 on the test set.  This 
value is simply calculated by summing the squares of the differences between actual and 
predicted values and dividing this by the number of observations. 
 
a. Model 
                              Value Std. Error  t value Pr(>|t|)  
               (Intercept)  -0.0589   0.0069    -8.5832   0.0000 
                   Red.Num   0.0008   0.0002     3.8700   0.0001 
               Red.Stealth   0.0018   0.0001    27.5267   0.0000 
                  Red.SSKP  -0.0006   0.0001    -8.0395   0.0000 
              Recon.Sensor  -0.0007   0.0001   -10.6925   0.0000 
              Recon.Firing  -0.0007   0.0001   -10.8866   0.0000 
      Red.Stealth:Red.SSKP   0.0000   0.0000    83.6031   0.0000 
Recon.Stealth:Recon.Firing   0.0000   0.0000    37.7593   0.0000 
Recon.Stealth:Recon.Sensor   0.0000   0.0000    36.4957   0.0000 
 Recon.Sensor:Recon.Firing   0.0000   0.0000    27.6237   0.0000 
          Red.Num:Red.SSKP   0.0000   0.0000    21.4914   0.0000 
 Recon.Stealth:Red.Stealth   0.0000   0.0000   -15.7155   0.0000 
  Red.Stealth:Recon.Firing   0.0000   0.0000    -8.7754   0.0000 
  Red.Stealth:Recon.Sensor   0.0000   0.0000    -8.5192   0.0000 
    Recon.Stealth:Red.SSKP   0.0000   0.0000   -10.4685   0.0000 
     Red.Num:Recon.Stealth   0.0000   0.0000    -7.7536   0.0000 
     Red.SSKP:Recon.Firing   0.0000   0.0000    -5.1305   0.0000 
     Red.SSKP:Recon.Sensor   0.0000   0.0000    -4.8794   0.0000 
 
Residual standard error: 0.1878 on 19982 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.6757  
F-statistic: 2449 on 17 and 19982 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0 
 
Table 7.   Linear Model of MOE2 for the 6-factor Data Set 
 
b. Normality Assumptions 
In order for linear regression models to be valid, the error is assumed to 
have a Gaussian (normal) distribution with constant variance and to be independent of the 
predictor values.  Noticeably in Figure 25 the residuals of our linear model have a 
constant variance while being distributed evenly around zero.  However, this plot also 
shows that the model is still under fit (underdeveloped) and needs improvement.  The 
plots in Figure 26 illustrates that the errors are approximately normal and symmetrical.  





Figure 25.   Residuals vs. Fitted Values for Linear Model of MOE2 
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Residuals vs. Fitted Values Plot 



















2. The Regression Tree Model for the Proportion of Red Killed 
After looking at the histograms and clusters associated with MOE1, we observed 
that this MOE take either low values, less than 0.25, or high values, greater than 0.75.  
Upon this discovery, a Regression Tree model seems appropriate for predicting the 
proportion of Red killed.  This model reveals a very interesting and important fact that 
the values of MOE1 can be predicted with great precision by using only two of the 
predictor variables.  Table 8 shows which variables are used in the model as well as the 
size and the residual mean deviance of the model.  When applied to the test set, it gives 
us a residual mean deviance of 0.0035, which is almost the same as the training error 
value.  Finally, the tree in Figure 27 is our model.  This model strongly suggests that the 
values of the response variable can be estimated by using two variables.  The model is 
also very simple and strong in predicting future data. 
 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
"Red.Stealth"   "Recon.Stealth" 
Number of terminal nodes:  3  
Residual mean deviance:  0.003473 = 69.45 / 20000 
 






Regression Tree Model of Red Prop for Small Data Set
 
Figure 27.   Regression Tree Model of MOE1 for the 6-factor Data Set 
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H. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Prior to the analysis, seven research questions of interest were presented.  In this 
section these questions are referred to by exploring the data sets using visual analysis 
tools and statistical methods.  These techniques include Sign Tests, Trellis plots, Scatter 
matrices, and Bayesian networks. 
 
1. The Blue Formation 
The First sets of sign tests are performed to determine the difference between two 
different blue formations.  For MOE1, the sign test shows no significant difference 
between the two scenarios.  In other words, the different formation of Blue vehicles and 
infantry does not have a significant effect on the number of Red casualties. 
For MOE2, the sign test suggests a significant difference between these two 
formations, and Scenario two, which has less Blue casualties, is superior to Scenario one.  
In other words, positioning vehicles up to the North and infantry down to the South is a 
better tactic for the Blue side in this specific infiltration scenario in terms of Blue 
casualties. 
 
2. The Red Formation 
For this question, the focus is on the third infiltration team of the Red side.  
Basically, we want to know whether a third infiltration team would make a difference on 
the MOEs.  Looking at the results of the sign test for MOE2, this three-team formation of 
the Red does not have a significant effect on Blue casualties.  On the other hand, this 
configuration does cause the Red side more casualties, increasing their chance of losing 
agents.  In conclusion, in this specific scenario, the three-team formation is not a better 
tactic than the two-team formation for the Red side because by using the three-team 
formation, the Red side takes more casualties than the Blue side. 
 
3. The Number of Red Agents 
The third question addresses the optimal number of Red agents to negate the Blue 
superiority in number and the ability of the agents.  To answer this question, Trellis plots 
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and Bar charts are used.  Figure 28 is the plot of MOE1 vs. MOE2 conditioned on the 
values of the number of Red agents.  In this plot the goal is to find the best condition for 
Red that is low value for the Red Prop and high value for the Blue Prop.  When looking 
at the plot on the upper left corner, we see a cluster of points, which are in favor of Red.  
Figure 29 also gives an idea of the best size of the Red teams.  This is a 3-D Barchart of 
the Blue Prop against the Red Stealth and the Red NumAgents.  This plot suggests that 
the optimal size of the Red teams should be around 16 to 24.  From these observations it 
can be concluded that the best number of Red agents for each Red infiltration team 
should be around 16 to 27. 
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Red.Num: 4.0 to 12.0 Red.Num: 12.0 to 19.0
Red.Num: 19.0 to 27.0 Red.Num: 27.0 to 35.4
Red NumAgents Conditional Plot
 
Figure 28.   Trellis Plot of Red Number of Agents Parameter 
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Barchart of Blue Prop vs. RedNumAgents
 
Figure 29.   Barchart of MOE2 vs. Red NumAgents and Red Stealth 
 
4. Aggressiveness of Red Agents  
This question relates to the Red personality weightings, w2, w8, w10 and the Red 
combat constraint.  The focus is on the values of these parameters and their effects on our 
MOEs.  To be able to answer this question Netica Bayesian Networks and Trellis Plots 
are used.  Figure 30 illustrates that if the Red agents remain indifferent against Blue 
vehicles and commanders, the Red agents do not attack the enemy and escape from the 









Bayesian Network of Red Personalities (Worst Case) 
 
Figure 30.   Bayesian Network of MOE2 for Red Personality Changes (Worst Case) 
 
In contrast, Figure 31 suggests that if Red is aggressive, Red’s propensity to the 
Blue commanders and vehicles is high and Red’s propensity to the Blue infantry is low, 
Blue takes medium and high casualties more often. 
 
Bayesian Network of Red Personalities (Best Case) 
 
Figure 31.   Bayesian Network of MOE2 for Red Personality Changes (Best Case) 
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Figure 32 shows the best case for Red’s personality in terms of Red casualties.  If 
the Red side is unconcerned about the Blue infantry and vehicles, and is not aggressive 
but fearful about the Blue commanders then the Red side does better by taking less 
casualties than other times. 
 
Bayesian Network of Red Personalities (Best Case) 
 
Figure 32.   Bayesian Network of MOE1 for Red Personality Changes (Best Case) 
 
Figure 33 illustrates the worst case for the Red team.  If the Red agents remain 
indifferent against Blue vehicles and commanders, do not attack the enemy and run away 










Bayesian Network of Red Personalities (Worst Case) 
 
Figure 33.   Bayesian Network of MOE1 for Red Personality Changes (Worst Case) 
 
Trellis plots (Figure 34) shown below support the findings from Bayesian 
Networks.  The first plot for the Red Combat shows that if Red agents become more 
aggressive then the Red side takes low or medium casualties while more often inflicting 
high Blue losses.  This is evident by especially looking at the points inside the circle.  In 
Figure 35 also the plot on the upper right corner suggests the best results for the Red 
team.  In this plot, the best results are obtained when the Red propensity to the Blue 
vehicles and infantry is high. 
In conclusion, the Red team gets the best results in terms of the proportion of Blue 
killed when being aggressive, attacking the Blue vehicles and commanders, and repelling 
from the Blue infantry.  If MOE1 is the concern then Red does better when repelling 
from the Blue commanders while remaining indifferent to the vehicles and infantries.  On 
the other hand, the worst result for the Red team obviously occurs when they are running 
away from the Blue infantry and when they are unconcerned about all other enemy 
agents. 
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Red.Combat: -10.0 to -5.0 Red.Combat: -5.0 to 0.0
Red.Combat: 0.0 to 4.0 Red.Combat: 4.0 to 9.1
Combat Conditional Plot
 
Figure 34.   Trellis Plot of Combat Parameter 
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Red.Team.w8: -64.0 to 0.0 Red.Team.w8: 0.0 to 64.6
Red.Team.w8: -64.0 to 0.0 Red.Team.w8: 0.0 to 64.6
Red.Team.w10: -64.0 to 0.0 Red.Team.w10: -64.0 to 0.0
Red.Team.w10: 0.0 to 64.6 Red.Team.w10: 0.0 to 64.6
Red's Propensity Conditional Plot
 




5. The Optimum Number of Targets for Reconnaissance Team 
One of our research questions is the optimum number of targets that should be 
fired upon by the Recon Team to help the infiltration.  The network in Figure 36 says that 
the best results can be obtained for the Red side by this combination of Recon 
parameters.  The Red force causes more casualties to the Blue force when the Recon 
Sensor and Firing Ranges are high, the Recon SSKP is high (shoots better), and the 
number of targets is medium.  Medium values vary between 6 and 10 for the Recon Max 
Targets parameter. 
Figure 37 also gives a sample of the optimum number of targets assigned to the 
Recon team.  When the Recon Sensor range is high the values of Max Targets parameter 
vary between 8 and 15.  If we combine these two results, we can conclude that the 
optimum number of targets to be assigned to the Recon team is around 8 to 10. 
 
Bayesian Network of Recon Parameters (Best Case) 
 
Figure 36.   Bayesian Network of MOE2 for Recon Parameters (Best Case) 
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Red.Recon.Max.Targets: 1.0 to 8.0 Red.Recon.Max.Targets: 8.0 to 15.2
Red.Recon.Max.Targets: 1.0 to 8.0 Red.Recon.Max.Targets: 8.0 to 15.2
Red.Recon.Sensor: 1.0 to 65.0 Red.Recon.Sensor: 1.0 to 65.0
Red.Recon.Sensor: 65.0 to 130.3 Red.Recon.Sensor: 65.0 to 130.3
Max Target Conditional Plot2
 
Figure 37.   Trellis Plot of Recon Max Targets Parameter 
 
6. Blue Infantry Parameters  
Our sixth question relates to the Blue infantry parameters and, specifically, to the 
Stealth parameter.  Belief networks and Trellis plots are used to explore the data to find 
an answer to this question.  The network in Figure 38 implies that the best result in terms 
of Red casualties happens when the Infantry Stealth is high and all other Infantry 
parameters are low.  This result is interesting because intuitively one expects it to be just 
the opposite.  The data, however, suggests that if the Blue infantry remains stealthy, 
shoots poorly, and keeps their ranges low, the enemy loses more agents.  This can be the 
result of Red agents getting closer and being killed by the Blue vehicles.  In other words, 
since the Red agents get closer to engage with the enemy they become the targets of the 
Blue vehicles.  Moreover, since the Red agents engage longer with the Blue agents due to 
poor shooting and high stealth of Blue infantry they suffer more casualties.  The same 
result can be seen in Figure 39.  In the lower right plot in this figure, the best results 




Bayesian Network of Infantry Parameters (Best Case) 
 
Figure 38.   Bayesian Network of MOE1 for Infantry Parameters (Best Case) 
 
















Blue.Infantry.Stealth: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.Stealth: 65.0 to 130.3
Blue.Infantry.Stealth: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.Stealth: 65.0 to 130.3
Blue.Infantry.Stealth: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.SSKP: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.SSKP: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.SSKP: 65.0 to 130.3 Blue.Infantry.SSKP: 65.0 to 130.3
Blue.Infantry.SSKP: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.Sensor: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.Sensor: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.Sensor: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.Sensor: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.Sensor: 65.0 to 130.3
Blue.Infantry.Firing: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.Firing: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.Firing: 1.0 to 65.0 Blue.Infantry.Firing: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue.Infantry.Firing: 1.0 to 65.0
Blue Parameters Conditional Plot
 




7. The Red Cohesion 
Our final question is the effect of Red’s cohesion on the outcome of the battle.  To 
measure this effect, three parameters of the Red force, the Red w1 (Propensity to friends), 
the Red w3 (Propensity to injured friends), and the Red Cluster, are used.  The first 
network in Figure 40 suggests that the Red side causes more casualties to the Blue side 
when the Red agents are not attracted to their friends and when they are allowed to form 
big clusters. 
Figure 41 shows the best outcome for the Red team in terms of MOE1.  Here the 
Red team takes fewer casualties if the Red agents repel from their injured friends, remain 
indifferent to their friends, and form big groups to attack the enemy.  Figure 42 also gives 
us similar results.  In this Figure, in the plot on the upper right, we notice the group of 
points that favor the Red side.  This plot says that the best tactic for the Red team is to 
form big clusters, go after friends and repel from injured friends.  In conclusion, more 
cohesive Red agents attracted to their friends and repelled from injured friends always 
perform better in this specific scenario. 
Bayesian Network of Red Cohesion Parameters for MOE2 (Best Case) 
 
Figure 40.   Bayesian Network of MOE2 for Red Cohesion Parameters (Best Case) 
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Bayesian Network of Red Cohesion Parameters for MOE1 (Best Case) 
 
Figure 41.   Bayesian Network of MOE1 for Red Cohesion Parameters (Best Case) 
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Figure 42.   Trellis Plot of Red Cohesion Parameters 
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In this chapter, the data sets are explored using several statistical analysis 
techniques and data visualization tools.  Several models developed using various 
statistical methods are presented.  The focus is first on describing the data and then using 
it to predict the future data.  The most important parameters for predicting MOEs are 
discovered and mentioned.  Finally, this chapter is concluded by answering our research 
questions based on the visual exploration of the data sets.  In the next chapter, we will 
give some recommendations to the model developers of MANA and the analysts who 


























































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
99 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
“So there are five ways of knowing who will win. Those who know when to fight 
and when not to fight are victorious. Those who discern when to use many or few troops 
are victorious. Those whose upper and lower ranks have the same desire are victorious.” 
Sun-Tzu 
 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains the recommendations to the developers of MANA and to 
the analysts that would like to study in this field.  The focus is on the possible 
improvements that might be considered by the model developers and the difficulties that 
have been encountered throughout the process of this thesis. 
 
B. MODEL DEVELOPERS 
This section explains the problems that have been encountered in the phase of 
putting the scenarios in MANA.  It also discusses some issues for consideration in the 
next versions of the model. 
· Terrain features should be considered in more detail.  In real situations, 
especially in guerrilla warfare, terrain is one of the most important factors 
that affect the outcome of the battle.  Because of this, terrain features, such 
as woods, buildings, hills, visibility, line of sight, should be incorporated 
into the model. 
· Scenario files that can be imported across different versions of MANA 
should be considered as an improvement to future versions.  Currently all 
available versions of MANA do not allow this. 
· Source code should be improved to overcome the problem of agents 
getting stuck due to obstacles on the battlefield.  The agent’s move 
selection algorithm could be modified to avoid this problem. 
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· In real situations agents of the same squad must be placed in the same 
location when taking up a defensive position on the battlefield.  They 
should stay put and stick to other agents in their squad.  In MANA since 
agents are not allowed to occupy the same cell, one must insert the agents 
individually in the model.  Otherwise, the agents in the same squad 
wander around their position and never stand still. 
· Vehicles, like tanks or ACVs, are not exactly realistic in the model.  A 
great deal of effort is needed to achieve the real performance of these 
agents.  Moreover, it is almost impossible to consider the abilities of the 
vehicles’ crewmembers.  Better algorithms should be incorporated to 
distinguish vehicles from other agents.  For example, a tank has three 
weapons with completely different capabilities and four crewmembers 
with different tasks.  Thus, it should be modeled as a more complicated 
system than regular agents. 
· Lethality of the agents can also be incorporated in MANA as a personality 
parameter. 
· Guerrilla units are eventually affected by strain, fatigue, and stress in 
guerrilla-style operations.  Integrating some parameters associated with 
these intangibles would be very useful to evaluate their effects on the 
outcome of an asymmetric war. 
· Guerrilla battles that were looked at in this study emphasize the 
significance of night combat and combat under poor weather conditions.  
In most cases the guerrillas prefer to engage with conventional forces 
under these conditions.  Therefore, weather conditions should also be 
considered in the model. 
· Mine locating and clearing is one of the most crucial concerns, awaiting 
the units encountering low intensity conflicts.  Hence, mine warfare 
should be considered as one of the future enhancements to the model. 
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· An increase of MOEs should be implemented including time to mission 
completion, number of enemy agents seen, etc. 
· Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube Designs developed by Tom Cioppa 
allows for a structured way of exploring MANA.  Integrating these 
designs in Supercomputer would be useful.  Furthermore, fractional 
factorial designs can also be incorporated to study the effects of the 
variables and their interactions. 
· Bayesian Belief Networks provide a means of presenting the effects of 
several variables simultaneously.  They offer an insightful way of 
displaying the effects and interactions of many variables in an organized 
and understandable format.  Incorporating Bayesian Networks in further 
developments of Agent Based Models would be beneficial. 
 
C. ANALYSTS 
This section gives some recommendations to the analysts who would like to study 
in this field in the future. 
· Great care should be given for developing a scenario and incorporating it 
in the model.  Insuring that the scenario runs on the model similarly to 
how it would in the real- life is critical. 
· Studying the effects of all variables in an ABM is almost impossible in 
most cases.  Thus, a clear understanding of which variables are of interest 
and how they will vary is necessary. 
· After the variable selection process the design to be used to explore the 
data should be determined and developed. 
· Several analysis techniques can be used to explore the data.  From our 
experiences, Cluster Analysis, Neural Networks, Regression Trees, and 
Bayesian Belief Networks are good tools when so many variables are of 
interest.  Also Trellis Plots and Scatter Matrices provide an insightful 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF THE BATTLES 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix introduces six guerrilla battles, which were fought after the WWII.  
The Appendix includes a brief summary and the lessons learned in terms of guerrilla 
tactics and techniques for each battle. 
 
B. THE CHINDITS 
The decisive campaign against the Japanese in Burma in World War II was the 
Battle of Imphal-Kohima.  For 100 days, from March through June 1944, the troops of 
the Fourteenth Army met their Japanese enemies in an intense struggle for control of the 
eastern gates to India.  Ultimately, this British Army defeated the Japanese and began the 
slow task of clearing the invaders from northern and southern Burma.  While this great 
battle was being contested, another war was being fought 200 miles in the Japanese rear.  
In this conflict, over 20,000 specially-trained jungle soldiers attempted to weaken the 
Japanese Army by delivering a “knockout blow to its unprotected guts”.  Three-thousand 
of these troops were American volunteers, officially known as the 5307th Composite Unit 
or more popularly known as “Merrill’s Marauders” or “Galahad”.  The other larger part 
of these soldiers was the Chindits, also known as the Special Force.  Essentially, Galahad 
and the Chindits were light infantry jungle troops organized and trained for guerrilla-style 
interdiction against Japanese lines of communication (LOC) [Ref.8]. 
Toward the end of the war, taking a lesson from the Chindits, the Fourteenth 
Army went on to defeat the Japanese Army in Burma in the Chindit style of boldness, 
aggressiveness, and confidence [Ref.8]. 
By the end of 1943, the Japanese had given up on invading India, believing that 
the jungles beyond the Chindwin River in Burma were impassable.  The Japanese choose 
to remain static and protect what they had.  The British were also more or less content in 




1. Lessons learned  
The Chindit War has great value for military historians and analysts because of 
the many conclusions regarding guerrilla-style operations in an enemy’s rear.  These 
conclusions are: 
· A properly- trained unit in the rear of an enemy can have an effect highly 
un-proportion to the actual numbers of men involved. Furthermore, a 
small force can defeat a larger force if it achieves surprise and attacks the 
enemy where it least expects an attack.  
· Guerrilla forces would prove themselves superior to their enemies by 
training hard and adapting to the environment.  They should modify the ir 
tactics to exploit the terrain better than their foes. 
· Galahad operations have exhibited a number of tactics that remain a model 
for guerrilla warfare: “a swift approach march along an unguarded route”; 
the preservation of surprise; a hasty, accurate reconnaissance, followed by 
a bold attack against the enemy’s weakness; and the employment of well-
aimed, disciplined fires [Ref.8].  
· Guerrilla units are eventually affected by strain, fatigue, and stress.  A 
limit exists as to how long a unit can be expected to remain effective in the 
enemy’s rear.  Evacuation of such men after a certain amount of time 
seems to be a targeted action.  
 
C. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES (CCF) IN KOREA 
In the autumn of 1950, forces of the United Nations Command, directed by 
General Douglas MacArthur, pushed confidently through the mountains of North Korea 
toward the Yalu River and the Manchurian border.  The UN Command advanced 
optimistically, even daring to forecast an end to the war by Christmas.  They did not 
know that a huge Chinese Army lay in wait, tensing for the right moment to overcome 
the UN columns. 
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The Chinese Army’s dependency on manpower and the roughness of the Korean 
terrain determined how the CCF was structured and employed during the Korean War.  
Compensating for its weakness in armaments and exploiting the possibilities of the rough 
Korean landscape, the Chinese developed a philosophy of “man over weapons” 
organizing a light infantry army to fight the war. 
In the first year of the war, the Chinese frequently demonstrated superior field 
craft, an almost inhuman endurance, and a sharp appreciation for terrain.  Undaunted by 
weather, terrain, or poverty, the CCF, during this stage of the war, pressed the UN 
Command to its limits.  
The most obvious weakness of the CCF was its severe shortage of military 
equipment.  Furthermore, the UN in firepower, transport, and air power hopelessly 
outmatched the Chinese.  A further Chinese debility was their tactical rigidity.  
Ultimately, these weaknesses were all magnified during the last stages of the war and the 
Chinese advantages in tactical maneuver, infiltration, and stealth lost their values.  By the 
autumn of 1951, the CCF lost its psychological advantage over the UN forces and began 
to suffer a morale  problem.  The firepower of the UN had equalized the manpower 
imbalance and, in the final analysis, negated Chinese strengths.  In conclusion, the 
Korean War also represents the limits to which the “man over weapons” philosophy can 
be carried [Ref.8]. 
 
1. Lessons learned  
The Korean War exhibited very important aspects of guerrilla warfare.  These are 
the most important lessons that can be taken from this war: 
· The main strengths of the CCF in the Korean War were its powerful 
philosophy of “man over weapons,” the skills and abilities of the 
individual light infantrymen, and the effectiveness of the CCF leadership.  
The integration of these strengths created a fierce battlefield instrument 
that achieved remarkable tactical successes [Ref.8].  
· Another lesson that can be drawn is that improvisation is a very crucial 
issue for exploiting asymmetric wars.  Guerrilla forces should use 
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whatever resources are at hand for the military purposes of camouflage, 
deception, booby traps, fortifications, and sustenance.  
 
D. BRITISH OPERATIONS IN MALAYA AND BORNEO 
 
1. The Malayan Emergency 
From 1948 to 1966, substantial British, Gurkha, and Commonwealth infantry 
forces participated continuously in prolonged light infantry operations in the Far East.  In 
Malaya, from 1948 to 1960, these British-directed forces defeated an indigenous 
Communist insurgent force.  Less than three years later, the British Army moved into 
North Borneo to secure that territory against Communist guerrillas and Indonesian 
aggression in a four-year war.  In both wars, the combat took place in extremely 
inhospitable terrain and it was swift, fleeting, and violent.  
In Malaya, the Communist insurgency had its origins in the organizations 
established by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) during World War II to fight the 
Japanese.  Trained, armed, and supplied by the British, the military arm of the MCP-
known as Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) grew into an extensive and 
efficient organization, some elements of which operated under British liaison officers.  
After the war ended, the MPAJA was disbanded and supposedly disarmed.  However, the 
hard-core Communist elements of this small army hid their arms and supplies in secret 
caches for future use.  
For a time, the MCP cooperated with the reestablished colonial administration in 
Malaya.  When it became clear, however, that the aims of the MCP to influence the 
establishment of a socialist-type “People’s Government” had no chance for success, the 
MCP adopted a more violent policy of social de-stabilization through labor unrest, 
strikes, and eventually, armed uprisings and acts of terrorism.  In response, the 
government of the Federation of Malaya declared a state of emergency on June 18, 1948 
and adopted emergency powers to deal with the violence.  In addition, the MCP was 
outlawed on July 23, 1948 [Ref.8]. 
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By 1960 the previously large terrorist jungle army was defeated and reduced to a 
few hundred men near the Thai border.  The Malay Government declared the end of the 
Emergency in July 1960. The result of the war was the establishment of the independent 
democratic nation of Malaya, later to become the present day Malaysia [Ref.39].  
 
2. The Confrontation with Indonesia 
Not long after cleaning out the last isolated pocket of Communist guerrillas in 
Malaya, the British forces in the Far East found themselves facing another limited war, 
this time in North Borneo.  
The large island of Borneo in 1962 comprised four political entities.  Kalimantan, 
the southern three-fourths of the island, belonged to Indonesia, independent since 1949.  
In the North, Britain administered the two provinces of Sarawak (in the West) and Sabah, 
also called North Borneo (in the North).  The sultanate of Brunei was an independent 
state ruled by a sultan but possessing a civil bureaucracy and police force staffed to a 
large degree by Englishmen.  
In 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the prime minister of Malaya, proposed the 
formation of a new federated state to be known as Malaysia.  Malaysia, Rahman 
suggested, should include the Federation of Malaya, the city-state of Singapore, the 
sultanate of Brunei, and the colonial provinces of Sarawak and Sabah.  Great Britain 
endorsed the idea, but President Sukarno of Indonesia opposed it, calling it a British 
neocolonialist project and a threat to Indonesian security.  Sukarno had his own dreams 
about a greater East Asian Federation under his leadership, which also was to include 
northern Borneo.  He openly announced a policy of “confrontation” in January 1963, 
following the Brunei revolt of December 1962.  Thus, the Brunei revolt was actually the 
beginning of a series of conflicts known as the Confrontation.  A small indigenous 
Communist organization, the Northern Borneo National Army (TNKU), which had ties to 
the Communist party of Indonesia, launched this revolt [Ref.8]. 
On the night of the September 30, 1965 a coup attempt, in which Indonesian 
communists became involved, occurred in Indonesia.  Six senior generals were killed.  
The coup failed and was followed by widespread violence and bloodshed.  It proved a 
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turning point for the Confrontation, which declined thereafter and on August 13, 1966 a 
formal agreement concluded between Indonesia and Malaysia bringing the conflict to an 
end [Ref.40]. 
 
3. Lessons learned 
The British operations in Malaya and Borneo had their own unique sets of 
conditions and parameters that strongly influenced the flow of events as well as the 
methods and techniques that characterize the guerrilla operations in general: 
· At the tactical level, the most important principle to be inferred from the 
British experience is that guerrillas must be masters of their environment.  
They have to endure tough terrain, exhaustion, heat and humidity, jungle 
pests, and severe mental and physical strain just to be able to get at the 
enemy.  Additionally guerrillas have to be more adept and capable in the 
jungle than their enemies in order to dominate the environment whether it 
is jungle, mountain, or arctic territory.  To achieve this mastery over the 
environment requires, above all else, a singleness of purpose, an attitude 
of self-reliance, persistent mental discipline and self-denial.  Furthermore, 
such domination of the environment depends on the adoption of an 
offensive, aggressive policy [Ref.8].  
· The development of timely, accurate intelligence leads to the success of 
tactical operations.  This intelligence originates largely from the local 
inhabitants and the police organizations.  Good intelligence appears to be a 
crucial cornerstone for guerrilla operations in counterinsurgency and low-
intensity conflicts. 
· The small-unit actions of the Emergency and Confrontation placed a 
premium on the quality of low-level infantry leaders.  The burdens of 
responsibility and decision-making borne by the NCOs, lieutenants, and 
captains in these campaigns far exceeded that experienced by the same 
ranks in conventional large-unit operations. 
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· These conflicts emphasized once again that there should be a limit to the 
physical and mental strain placed on guerrilla fighters.  After certain time 
the teams rapidly lost their effectiveness as their physical and mental 
abilities were worn out.  
· The actions in Malaya and Borneo paralleled each other in important 
respects.  For example, the British adhered to a 3x3 squad organization in 
both conflicts; therefore, they split their squads into 3 teams with 3 
infantrymen in each team.  This type of organization appeared to be highly 
valuable in independent squad- level actions, probably because of the 
flexibility that it provided [Ref.8].  
· The development of good British marksmanship in both struggles was 
essential to success.  Winning and surviving for a guerrilla meant shooting 
first, shooting straight, and shooting to kill. 
· In both battles the best ideas on tactical operations come from the units 
themselves.  The Director of Operations should put their staffs to work 
collecting and evaluating these ideas, not dreaming up their own notions 
and imposing them on the infantry units.  
· The British approach to “winning hearts and minds” deserves a great deal 
of study among all military analysts and historians.  This principle was 
vital to success at every level and was impressed on the lowest soldier in 
the chain of command.  For infantrymen, it basically meant protecting the 
citizens of the country, respecting their  persons and their property, and not 
being afraid to get close to them [Ref.8]. 
 
E. AFGHAN-SOVIET WAR 
Soviet forces came to the assistance of a Marxist government that had come to 
power in Kabul through a military coup in April 1978.  The hostility of the revolutionary 
government toward the Islamic religion led to increasing opposition.  Soviet intervention 
on 24-27 December 1979 installed another Marxist leader in power.  However, the Soviet 
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presence quickly led to the emergence of the mujahideen (the warriors of God), who 
waged a guerrilla war against Soviet and government forces.  The Soviet Army found it 
hard to operate against Afghan guerrillas in the mountains, even when deploying modern 
airpower and helicopters against them.  The mujahideen had a safe refuge in Pakistan and 
received modern weapons, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the United States.  
International opposition and the rising cost of the war, including an estimated 13,000 
dead, led to the Soviet’s withdrawal in February 1989 and the fall of Kabul to the 
mujahideen in April 1992 [Ref.19]. 
 
1. Lessons learned 
Modern, mechanized forces are still in peril when committed to fight guerrillas in 
the middle of a civil war on rugged terrain.  The Soviet-Afghanistan war demonstrated 
the following Lessons- learned:  
· A guerrilla war is not a war of technology versus peasantry.  Rather, it is a 
contest of endurance and national will.  The side with the greatest moral 
commitment (ideological, religious or patriotic) will hold the ground at the 
end of the conflict.  Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant, since 
victory is often determined by morale, obstinacy and survival [Ref.19].  
· Secure logistics and secure lines of communication are essential for the 
guerrilla and non-guerrilla force.  Security missions, however, can tie up 
most of a conventional force.  Existence of safe havens, such as neighbor 
countries, is also a great asset for guerrilla forces to restructure and re-
supply their units  
· Weapons systems, field gear, communications equipment and transport 
that are designed for conventional war will often work less effectively or 
fail completely on rugged terrain.  
· Tactics for conventional war will not work against guerrillas.  Forces need 
to be reequipped, restructured and retrained for fighting guerrillas or for 
fighting as guerrillas.  The most effective combatants are light infantry.  
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· Tanks have a limited utility for the counter-guerrilla force, but can serve 
as an effective reserve on the right terrain.  Armored combat vehicles and 
helicopters can play an important role in mobility and fire support.  
Mechanized forces usually fight effectively only when dismounted and 
when using their carriers for support or as a maneuver reserve. 
In summary, whatever else these lessons may show, the most fundamental of 
them is that no army, however sophisticated, well trained, materially rich, numerically 
overwhelming and ruthless, can succeed on the battlefield if it is not psychologically fit 
and motivated for the fight.  The force; however destitute in material advantages and 
numbers, relying on the moral qualities of a strong faith, stubborn determination, 
individualism and unending patience will always be the winner.  These may not be the 
optimum qualities always found in the armies of western democracies fighting in foreign 
soil [Ref.19].  
 
F. THE RUSSIAN-CHECHEN WAR 
In December 1994 Russian authorities made their first attempt to crush Chechen 
separatism militarily.  However, after two years of bloody combat the Russian Army was 
forced to withdraw from the Chechen Republic.  The obstinacy of the Russian authorities 
that had decided on a policy of victory in Chechnya resulted in the deaths of at least 
30,000 Chechens and 5,000 Russian soldiers.  This war, which caused an estimated $5.5 
billion US dollars in economic damage, was part of the cause of Russia’s national 
economic crisis in 1998, when the Russian government proved unable to service its huge 
debts [Ref.16]. 
Several months of Russian attacks shifted the balance of power in Chechnya and 
changed war analysts’ perspective of urban warfare.  The tactics employed by both sides 
are forcing experts to take another look at the concept of urban warfare. 
On the other hand, the Chechen rebels were quick to adapt to changing strategic, 
as well as tactical, situations.  Recognizing the value of information operations, they 
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employed advanced commercial communications systems that actually exceeded the 
quality of the military gear issued to the Russian army.  
The Russians were not careful about decoded talking on their communication 
systems.  Almost all Chechens speak Russian, so they were able to listen to Russian 
messages and transmit misleading instructions that redirected Russian artillery and 
aircraft missions.  Russian interior troops in particular were careless about unsecured 
radio communications.  In contrast, the Chechens had a native form of secured 
communications.  While virtually every Chechen speaks Russian, almost no Russians 
speak Chechen.  By adding a few simple code phrases, the rebels could communicate in 
the open without fear of interception.  In addition, most of the Chechen radio operators 
recognized each other by voice.  
The Russians basically saw the Chechens as guerillas or bandits who could not 
stay and fight.  This contrasted with the reality of a hardened, dedicated ethnic group 
possessing of a history of fierce fighting for their longtime homeland against superior 
powers.  Once the Russians entered Grozny, they quickly realized that their adversary 
was much more determined than expected [Ref.16]. 
 
1. Lessons learned 
This conflict also presented some of the most important lessons in terms of 
asymmetric war.  These lessons are: 
· In times of asymmetric wars, the side, lacking the stronger vast manpower 
resources, should withdraw from indefensible positions to rugged territory 
that more easily negates many of the enemy’s strengths.  
· It is a terrible mistake for both sides to fail to understand the cultural 
aspects of the conflict  
· The lack of small, skilled infantry units at company levels and below 
plagues an anti-guerrilla force throughout the operation.  Coupled with 
this is the presence of a “strategic corporal” in an anti-guerrilla force that 
provides experience and leadership for a small unit in combat.  Lacking 
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noncommissioned officers in a highly skilled infantry can become costly 
in an urban environment.  In some cases airborne, naval infantry and 
Special Forces interior units, who have more cohesive structures, perform 
better in urban or rural terrain against guerrillas. 
· Guerrilla forces must be careful about their radio conversations.  Secured 
communication plays a very important role in asymmetric war 
environment. 
· Targeted use of smaller, more effective infantry units by anti-guerrilla 
forces will always have its pay-off.  These forces are more cohesive.  They 
would engage guerrilla forces to draw them into combat; at which point 
the anti-guerrilla forces can call in air strikes or artillery on the rebel 
positions.  The specialized forces then would eliminate any surviving 
resistance.  
· Two of the weapon systems used in this conflict proved to be “absolutely 
devastating” inside the urban environment.  One is the RPG, which many 
Chechens now refer to as their national weapon.  The second-most useful 
guerrilla weapon is the sniper.  The Chechens used independent sniper 
scout teams deployed in small numbers in buildings throughout the city. 
· Good cultural intelligence has also grown in importance.  This intelligence 
is valuable both for dealing with adversaries and for understanding 
noncombatants in the conflict area.  
 
G. TURKEY STRUGGLES WITH TERRORISM 
Since its establishment in 1923, Turkey has maintained a vigilant eye on potential 
threats from across its borders with Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the former 
Soviet Union.  Today, however, the greatest threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity comes 
from within its borders.  This threat is the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which is a 
militant, terrorist, and separatist organization [Ref.10]. 
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The PKK is a terrorist organization that has adopted the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and plays the role of the religious fundamentalists. This group depends upon 
circumstances to weaken and divide Turkey with actions based on violence while 
attempting to establish a Marxist Kurdish State in Turkey.  The PKK terrorist 
organization uses the method of “Revolutionist Violence” to reach its goal and tries to 
subdue the people in southeastern Anatolia by terror and pressure.  This primitive, savage 
and bloody terrorist organization, with the claim of protecting the rights of the so-called 
Kurdish people, has brutally murdered over 30,000 people, including an estimate of 4,000 
Turkish soldiers [Ref.9]. 
The PKK terrorist organization is able to continue its existence through the shelter 
and monetary support provided by outside countries.  Furthermore, the PKK terrorist 
group organizes aid campaigns through its auxiliary organizations in Europe to increase 
its financial resources.  The PKK conducts this by forcibly collecting funds from the 
citizens of the Republic of Turkey living in those countries and by engaging in drug 
smuggling.  The money obtained from drug smuggling is a very large share in the total 
revenues of the organization.  The organization is able to purchase weapons, ammunition 
and equipment, due to the considerable profits obtained from this illegal trade [Ref.9]. 
The PKK terrorist organization commits all kinds of organized crimes besides its 
terrorist activities.  The organization increasingly resorts to drug smuggling followed by 
weapons and human smuggling and money laundering activities in order to finance its 
endeavors [Ref.9]. 
The terrorist identity of the PKK has been accepted by the main Western 
countries; led by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany.  Furthermore, 
France and Germany banned any activities associated with the PKK and its auxiliary 
branches in 1993.  Upon the prohibitions and restrictions brought by many Western 
European countries, the organization has shifted these types of operations to Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans while continuing many of its operations in the Western European 
countries under the guise of “cultural activity.”  With this connection, the PKK terrorist 
organization continues to form many associations, which it claims, have humanitarian 
purposes [Ref.9]. 
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Turkey has obtained significant successes in recent periods against the terrorist 
organization, which it has been fighting for over 15 years.  In addition, Turkey has taken 
concrete steps on discontinuing any support provided to the organization from abroad.  
Due to this effort, Syria, with the Adana Agreement signed on October 20, 1998, has for 
the first time accepted the PKK to be a terrorist organization agreeing to close down the 
auxiliary branches of the organization in Syria.  Moreover, the founder and chief of the 
terrorist organization, who was secretly sent to Kenya to hide, was captured on February 
16, 1999 and brought to Turkey [Ref.9].  While still ongoing, the tide has turned against 
the PKK who are increasingly resorting to political means. 
 
1. Lessons learned  
This conflict presents some instructive and contemporary aspects of guerrilla 
warfare.  The role of Turkish Army in assisting internal forces to combat the PKK is 
directly related to operations other than war (OOTW) [Ref.10].  Thus, an examination of 
the use of military forces during this conflict reflects some of the challenges that may 
face all conventional forces in future OOTW missions: 
· Violent PKK raids on small villages underscored the severity of the 
internal security threat.  Police forces in urban areas, supplemented by 
gendarmerie operating in the vast mountainous expanse of Southeastern 
Turkey, were unable to provide adequate security to citizens living in 
remote settlements.  Therefore, the government instituted a Temporary 
Village Protection (GKK) system in 1985, initiating the formation of a 
civilian militia under the Interior Minister. 
· Under the provisions of the GKK system, village guards are recruited from 
Kurdish tribes loyal to the state.  These paid volunteers, who do not wear 
distinctive uniforms, receive small arms and minimal training from the 
government and represent a deterrent state security force in small villages. 
· Turkish forces finally realized the importance of intelligence, especially 
from local people, after having suffered so many military and civilian 
casualties.  Special Forces personnel have been trained as local citizens 
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and sent out to live in those villages gathering intelligence about activities, 
locations, and logistics networks of terrorists.  This application has served 
two important purposes.  First, timely and precise intelligence have been 
gathered and second strong relationships have been formed between the 
government and citizens living in those areas.  
· Tanks, Armored Combat Vehicles, and Helicopters have been effectively 
used against terrorists, especially in suitable terrains.  Especially, 
firepower, sensor ranges, maneuver capabilities, and thermal systems of 
these assets provide big advantages to conventional forces against 
guerrillas.  Utilizing these assets in full coordination with ground troops 
and as a fire support for infantry missions increases this effect. 
· This conflict also emphasized the significance of night combat and combat 
under poor weather conditions.  In most cases the terrorists prefer to 
engage with Turkish forces under these conditions.  Thermal sight and 
night sight systems have been widely used.  
· Mine warfare was the most challenging issue, causing many problems for 
Turkish forces.  Terrorists have effectively used mine warfare against 
friendly vehicles and infantry units.  Mine locating and clearing is one of 
the most crucial concerns, awaiting the units encountering these kinds of 
conflicts.  
· Most of the battles that have occurred between the two sides show a 
striking contrast to the detailed and precise information given in map 
problems.  The situation, particularly in guerrilla warfare, is almost 
invariably covered in obscurity.  Occasionally the information at hand 
may be false or misleading; therefore, the leader has to recognize the lack 
of reliable information and prepare for prompt and decisive action. 
· Much of the ability of a leader to avoid friendly casualties and to increase 
the number of enemy casualties is determined prior to the skirmish.  So, 
the responsibilities have to be clearly stated beforehand and given to each 
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member of the unit.  Doubts or questions in the minds of the soldiers 
should be absent when the battle commences. 
· Trade-offs always exists between mobility and firepower of guerrilla 
forces.  Since the mobility of the force is more critical in most cases 
guerrilla forces should be equipped with light weapons, such as rifles- 
including sniper rifles- machine guns, RPGs and 60-mm. mortars.  Mine 
detectors and medical gear should be with the platoon.  As a standard rule, 
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED MANA DESCRIPTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix explains the details of the MANA model.  It gives some key 
concepts and the details of the parameters in the model. 
 
B. KEY CONCEPTS 
 
1. Squads 
A squad is a group of agents of any size.  These agents share the same properties, 
and can either switch between states individually or as a group.  A state is a set of 
parameters values that determine the automaton’s current behavior [Ref.1]. 
Apart from the behavioral and capability parameters, entities in the same squad 
also share a situational awareness map of enemy contacts, and waypoints that may be 
used to guide the entities around the battlefield [Ref.1]. 
 
2. Battlefield 
The default Battlefield for MANA is a 200 x 200 grid of cells, each of which can 
be occupied by a single entity only.  No agents can wander off the battlefield boundaries 
[Ref.1].  However, not all cells need to be equivalent.  Currently, there are three different 
types of cell: Plain, Easy Going, and Obstacle. 
Plain terrain has no special properties.  Easy Going terrain represents roads, or 
other areas that are particularly attractive to move along.  Yellow coloring corresponds to 
these areas.  In this version of MANA, an entity in an Easy Going cell experiences no 
difference when occupying it.  However, entities can have their personalities set towards 
Easy Going terrain.  Thus, a “convoy” can be made to stay close to a “road”.  Gray 
coloring represents obstacle terrain.  No entity may occupy an Obstacle cell.  However, in 
this version, entities can see through Obstacle cells. 
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Only the correct shade of gray and yellow cause an entity to react to it.  However, 
the main view of the battlefield may be colored to give the impression of open terrain or 
cover.  Such backgrounds have no effect on the entities in the model, and are purely for 
decorative purpose.  Even so, using such an ornamental background helps the user 
illustrate that the values chosen for the “Stealth” or “Sensor” parameters for a particular 
scenario represent operating entities in a wooded area with plenty of cover, for example.  
A background, which appears as woods, helps emphasize this.  Despite any decorative 
visual distractions, Viewing the map as if appears to the entities is easily done by clicking 
on the View menu at the top of the screen and selecting Terrain as Seen by Agents 
[Ref.1].  This is shown in Figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43.   Terrain as seen by agents. 
 
3. Waypoints 
Waypoints (shown as flags on the Battlefield) can be set up to guide the 
movement of entities.  An entity's personality settings can be used to attract or repel it 
from its next waypoint [Ref.1].  
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4. Situational Awareness 
Squads of agents can share“memory” of the enemy squads’ locations in the form 
of a collective picture of sensor information.  A squad may share this information with 
other squads.  This is the method of representing inter-squad communication in MANA.  
A nominated Headquarter (HQ) squad collects all information in its side’s collective 
sensor range in the form a Situation Awareness (SA) map [Ref.1]. 
A squad’s current SA “map” can be shown by selecting Situational Awareness of 
Squad in the View menu.  The arrows at the bottom are used to select the desired view of 
the squad’s SA map [Ref.1].  Figure 44 shows an example: 
 
 
Figure 44.   Squad Situational Awareness. 
 
Note that the enemy locations are color-coded; Red represents the highest threat 
level and fades to yellow, light gray and then disappears with time.  The rate of color 
decay can be set for each squad [Ref.1]. 
The boxed area on the SA map is the region other agents must be in to react to the 
information.  Thus friendly units can be monitored keep their distance from known 
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enemy locations by making them retreat whenever they enter the area of the box.  A 
squad’s personality parameters can be used to force entities to respond to different threat 
“levels” using this map and the color-coding scheme [Ref.1]. 
 
C. EDITING SQUAD PROPERTIES 
The properties of Squads are edited by using the Edit Squad Properties screen 
under the Setup menu [Ref.1].  There are three separate parts to this screen, each accessed 
via its own tab: 
· General Properties: Starting points, goals, number of agents, number of 
squads and squad home. 
· Personality Properties: Personality weightings, firepower, stealth and 
icons. 
· Ranges: Sensor range, weapon range, movement speed and other 
constraints. 
 
1. General Squad Properties 
General Squad Properties are independent of the Squad's current state [Ref.1].  
Figure 45 shows the General Squad Properties screen. 
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Figure 45.   General Squad Properties. 
 
· Squad #: This shows the currently selected squad, along with its icon. 
· Side Name: This provides a name for the current squad. 
· No of Agents: This allows selection of number of agents in a Squad. 
· Squad Home (x, y): This is the center of the area within which the squad 
starts.  Members of the Squad are placed at random locations within this 
area at the start of each run. 
· Radius: This is the maximum distance from the Home coordinates that 
the agents are randomly placed on at start up. 
· HQ Squad: All Squads of the same Allegiance with the same HQ Squad 
share the same Situational Awareness map.  Any and all friendly Squads 
can be used as an HQ Squad. 
· Move precision: MANA allows a degree of randomness in the movement 
of entities.  Though the effect of this parameter depends largely on how 
the other parameters are set, it is particularly useful for preventing Squad 
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members from moving too rigidly or getting stuck behind obstacles.  
Additionally, it can cause Squads to become dispersed and to choose a 
winner (tie breaker) when deciding where to move next when two or more 
moves are equivalent.  A small value makes the entities move more 
rigidly, whereas a large value increases the randomness. 
· Threat rate: This is the number of time steps that must pass for a threat 
on the Situational Awareness map to decay one level.  For example, if the 
threat rate is 40, it will take 40 time steps for a Level 3 threat to turn to a 
Level 2 threat, and another 40 steps for a Level 2 threat to turn to a Level 
1 threat, and another 40 steps to be forgotten altogether.  This allows the 
user to manipulate the entities into reacting differently to older 
information.  Once the units are “forgotten”, they disappear from the SA 
map. 
· Waypoints: Waypoints are entered straight onto the Map picture, in 
reverse order, by clicking the left mouse button [Ref.1]. 
 
2. Personality Squad Properties 
These parameters describe the basic personalities of the entities and allow 
specifying changes based on circumstances (i.e., how the personalities switch between 




Figure 46.   The Squad Personality Tab. 
 
· Icon: This selects which icon (displayed in the bottom left-hand corner) is 
to be used for the Squad in its present state. 
· Allegiance: This selects which “side” a squad is on in the selected state.  
By convention Blue Force is Allegiance 1, Red Force is Allegiance 2 and 
Allegiance 0 is neutral. 
· Threat: This parameter allows the user some ability to cause the entities 
to react differently to different types of units recorded on the Situational 
Awareness map.  Units appear on the SA map as red if Level 3, yellow if 
Level 2, and gray if Level 1.  The level of threat falls from 3 to 2, 2 to 1, 
etc., after a determined period of time.  This also allows the user to 
manipulate the entities to react differently to older information, as well as 
to different threat types. 
· Stealth: The Stealth parameter is intended to represent how difficult it is 
to see an entity once it is within an enemy entity’s Sensor range.  It 
represents the degree of cover an entity is assumed to be able to use.  An 
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entity with a Stealth factor of 100 is impossible to see and, therefore, 
impossible to kill while a Stealth value of 0 makes no difference to 
visibility or kill probability. 
· Firepower: This is the probability of killing an enemy entity with a single 
shot (SSKP). 
· w1 - w10: These are the weightings entities use to determine their next 
move.  The higher the weighting is, the greater the attraction.  Likewise, 
the more negative the weighting is, the greater the repulsion.  The 
weighting factors affect the way entities react to other entities, Waypoints, 
terrain and information on the Situational Awareness map.  Table 9 lists 
and describes the weighting factors. 
 
Table 9.   Description of Weighting Factors 
 
· Trigger States: This determines which state an entity is currently in.  The 
state, in turn, determines the entity’s appearance (icon), Allegiance, Threat 
Level, Stealth, Firepower, and Personality Weighting values as well as the 
values used on the Ranges Squad Properties screen. 
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· Duration: This is the number of time steps a squad will stay in a state 
once that state has been triggered. 
· Fallback State: Once the Duration time has expired, the entity 
automatically falls back to the Default state, unless otherwise specified.  
The Fallback State box allows the user to choose which state the entity 
falls back [Ref.1].  
 
3. The Ranges Squad Properties 
As with the Personality Squad Properties, the Ranges Squad Properties are 




Figure 47.   The Ranges Squad Properties Tab. 
 
· Sensor Range: An entity can identify any other entity or terrain with this 
number of cells. 
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· Firing Range: An entity can shoot at any other entity within this number 
of cells. 
· Movement Speed: An entity can move this number of cells in a single 
time step (0 to 100 cells). 
· Min Distance to Friends: This parameter limits the distance to which 
friendly entities approach each other.  The value entered is the minimum 
distance, in terms of number of cells that the entities try to maintain. 
· Min Distance from Enemies: As with Min Distance to Friends, this 
parameter is the minimum distance (measured in number of cells) that an 
entity tries to keep between it and the enemy. 
· Min Distance from Next Flag: This is similar to the other Min Distance 
parameters, except that this is the minimum distance to the next Waypoint. 
· Min Distance from Enemy Flag: This is similar to the other Min 
Distance parameters, except that this is the minimum distance to the 
Enemy’s Final Waypoint, referred to as the Enemy Flag. 
· Min Distance from Easy Going: This is the minimum distance that an 
agent keeps from Easy Going terrain. 
· Cluster Constraint: The cluster constraint is designed to prevent agents 
from clustering in groups larger than a specified size, as determined by the 
value of this parameter.  It operates on the attraction towards friends.  
Once the friend’s penalty component, which is defined later in this 
chapter, of a move is calculated, it is only counted if the number of friends 
within sensor range is greater than the cluster constraint.  Otherwise, the 
penalty is set to zero, thus ignoring friends if in a group larger than the 
cluster constraint size.  If the cluster constraint is zero or if the personality 
component towards friends is negative (repelled from friends) then the 
cluster constraint is ignored. 
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· Combat Constraint: The combat constraint permits advancing toward the 
enemy only if a certain numerical advantage is met, i.e., outnumber the 
enemy by a number of agents.  The combat constraint modifies the penalty 
component for moving toward enemies and injured enemies.  The 
numerical advantage is calculated as     number friends – number enemy 
(in sensor range).  If the difference is greater than the combat constraint, 
then the move toward enemy penalty is counted, otherwise it is negated, 
i.e., an attraction toward enemy becomes repulsion.  If the combat 
constraint is zero or if the personality weight towards the enemy is 
negative (repelled from the enemy), then the combat constraint is ignored. 
· Advance Constraint: The advance constraint stops the penalty 
component from moving toward the next goal (waypoint).  This constraint 
is intended to prevent a Squad advancing towards its next goal without 
sufficient support.  If the number of friends within an agent's sensor range 
is fewer than the advance constraint, then the penalty toward the next goal 
is negated i.e., repelled from next goal, rather than attracted. 
· Number of Hits to Kill: This identifies the number of hits an entity can 
sustain before it is deemed to be killed.  If the number of hits is greater 
than one then the first hit puts the entity into the Injured State.  Subsequent 
hits have no further effect until the number of hits to kill is reached. 
· Max Targets per Step: This determines the number of targets within both 
sensor and firing range that can be shot at in a single time step. 
· Threat Influence Range: As discussed in the section on Situational 
Awareness, whenever an enemy entity is marked on the Situational 
Awareness map, a boxed area appears around it. Within this boxed region, 
agents are able to react to the recorded enemy location.  The reason for 
restricting the effect of SA information to a designated area around the 
enemy target is to allow entities to keep their distance from known enemy 
positions, without necessarily running away from them.  That is, they only 
run away if within the Influence Range area.  Likewise, if the entity’s 
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personality is such that it chases enemy entities, the Influence Area is 
supposed to represent how near the entity needs to be before it will bother 
to chase.  The Threat Influence Range is simply the number of cells this 
area is wide [Ref.1]. 
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APPENDIX C. CLUSTER ANALYSIS REPORTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix presents the results of Cluster Analysis completed in Clementine.  
As previously stated two data sets exist in our analysis: the 22-factor data set and the 6-
factor data set.  The purpose of the Cluster Analysis is to compare our MOEs to explore 
the patterns associated with them.  In this analysis, the MOEs are partitioned into three 
categories.  For both MOEs, the values from 0 to 0.25 are assigned a value of 0 (low), the 
values from 0.25 to 0.75 are assigned a value of 1 (medium), and the values bigger than 
0.75 are assigned a value of 2 (high). 
 
B. THE 22-FACTOR DATA SET 
In the clustering report below five clusters exist.  In Cluster-1, 24 percent of the 
data, Red inflicts medium Blue casualties while suffering high casualties approximately 
50 percent of the time.  In Cluster-2, 2.5 percent of the data, both sides suffer low 
casualties.  In Cluster-3, 1 percent of the data, Blue takes low casualties while inflicting 
medium Red loses.  In Cluster-4, 1 percent of the data, Red inflicts high casualties on 
Blue while taking medium or high casualties.  Finally, in Cluster-5, 71.5 percent of the 
data, Blue lose few agents while Red lose many agents. 
 
Number of inputs = 6 
Number of records = 51300 
Initial number of clusters = 5 
Final number of clusters = 5 
 
cluster 1: 12347 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    1 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    0 -> 0.14708 
    1 -> 0.319754 
    2 -> 0.533165 
----------------------------- 
cluster 2: 1253 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    0 -> 1.0 
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  Red Prop : 
    0 -> 1.0 
----------------------------- 
cluster 3: 505 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    0 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    1 -> 1.0 
----------------------------- 
cluster 4: 577 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    2 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    0 -> 0.017331 
    1 -> 0.242634 
    2 -> 0.740035 
----------------------------- 
cluster 5: 36618 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    0 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    2 -> 1.0 
----------------------------- 
 
C. THE 6-FACTOR DATA SET 
Another Cluster Analysis is performed for the 6- factor data set.  Five clusters 
also exist in this analysis.  In Cluster-1, 67 percent of the data, Blue takes low casualt ies 
most of the time while causing high Red loses.  In Cluster-2, 22 percent of the data, Red 
inflicts medium Blue casualties while suffering low casualties.  In Cluster-3, only 4 
observations, Red takes low casualties while inflicting high Blue casualties.  In Cluster-4, 
0.8 percent of the data, Red suffers low casualties while Blue takes high casualties.  
Finally, in Cluster-5, 10 percent of the data, both sides take low casualties. 
Number of inputs = 6 
Number of records = 24300 
Initial number of clusters = 5 
Final number of clusters = 5 
 
cluster 1: 16182 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    0 -> 0.9285 
    1 -> 0.068224 
    2 -> 0.003275 
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  Red Prop : 
    2 -> 1.0 
----------------------------- 
cluster 2: 5267 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    1 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    0 -> 0.997341 
    1 -> 0.002658 
----------------------------- 
cluster 3: 4 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    2 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    1 -> 1.0 
----------------------------- 
cluster 4: 197 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    2 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
    0 -> 1.0 
----------------------------- 
cluster 5: 2650 examples 
  Blue Prop : 
    0 -> 1.0 
  Red Prop : 
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APPENDIX D. NEURAL NETWORK REPORTS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix gives the results of the Neural Network models developed in 
Clementine.  Two data sets exist: the 22-factor data set and the 6-factor data set. 
 
B. THE 22-FACTOR DATA SET 
A neural network is created for the 22-factor data set.  The data set is split into 
training and test sets.  The training set includes 10 percent of the data.  The test set 
contains another 10 percent of the data. 
 
1. Red Killed 
The first model is developed and tested for MOE1, the proportion of Red killed.  
The report below illustrates the size of the different layers of the network, its predicted 
accuracy on the training set and the relative importance of each variable in predicting the 
MOE in the model. 
a. Training 
 
Neural Network "Red Prop" architecture 
 
Input Layer     : 22 neurons 
Hidden Layer #1 : 8 neurons 
Output Layer    : 1 neurons 
Predicted Accuracy :  96.72% 
 
Relative Importance of Inputs 
 Red Stealth    : 0.49745 
 Red Movement   : 0.19273 
 Red w2         : 0.16879 
 Vehicles Firing: 0.16734 
 Red NumAgents  : 0.16699 
 Red SSKP       : 0.15990 
 Red w1         : 0.14304 
 Red w10        : 0.13651 
 Red Combat     : 0.13354 
 Blue   Stealth : 0.13155 
 Red w3         : 0.13120 
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 Blue   Sensor  : 0.12004 
 Recon Firing   : 0.11812 
 Recon SSKP     : 0.11138 
 Vehicles Sensor: 0.10753 
 Recon Max Trgts: 0.10676 
 Red w8         : 0.10652 
 Recon Sensor   : 0.10158 
 Recon Stealth  : 0.10064 
 Blue   Firing  : 0.09517 
 Red Cluster    : 0.09507 
 Blue     SSKP  : 0.08039 
 
b. Prediction on the Test Set 
After developing the model, the test set is used to see its predictive power.  
In this report, especially, the mean absolute error is of interest, which is 0.033. 
Results for output field Red Prop 
    Error analysis for $N-Red Prop 
        Minimum Error       :        -0.43703 
        Maximum Error       :         0.28549 
        Mean Error          :        -0.0097315 
        Mean Absolute Error :         0.033438 
        Standard Deviation  :         0.052032 
        Linear Correlation  :         0.97615 
        Occurences          :         10234 
 
2. Blue Killed 
Another network model is developed and tested for MOE2, the proportion of Blue 
killed.  The report below illustrates the size of the different layers of the network, its 
predicted accuracy on the training set and the relative importance of each variable in 
predicting the MOE in the model. 
 
a. Training 
Neural Network "Blue Prop" architecture 
 
Input Layer     : 22 neurons 
Hidden Layer #1 : 8 neurons 
Output Layer    : 1 neurons 
 
Predicted Accuracy :  95.23% 
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Relative Importance of Inputs 
 Red Stealth    : 0.30289 
 Red NumAgents  : 0.22495 
 Red SSKP       : 0.18002 
 Recon Firing   : 0.14796 
 Recon Stealth  : 0.12291 
 Red Combat     : 0.11536 
 Recon SSKP     : 0.11012 
 Red Movement   : 0.10599 
 Blue     SSKP  : 0.10463 
 Blue   Stealth : 0.10459 
 Recon Sensor   : 0.10362 
 Recon Max Trgts: 0.09819 
 Vehicles Firing: 0.09808 
 Blue   Firing  : 0.09374 
 Red w1         : 0.08430 
 Vehicles Sensor: 0.07851 
 Red w10        : 0.07825 
 Red Cluster    : 0.07091 
 Red w2         : 0.06928 
 Red w3         : 0.06421 
 Blue   Sensor  : 0.05188 
 Red w8         : 0.05113 
 
 
b. Prediction on the Test Set 
After developing the model, the test set is used to see its predictive power.  
In this report, especially, the mean absolute error is of interest, which is 0.048. 
 
Results for output field Blue Prop 
    Error analysis for $N-Blue Prop 
        Minimum Error       :        -0.55604 
        Maximum Error       :         0.78042 
        Mean Error          :         0.0041290 
        Mean Absolute Error :         0.048269 
        Standard Deviation  :         0.094468 
        Linear Correlation  :         0.90514 






C. THE 6-FACTOR DATA SET 
A neural network is created for the 6-factor data set.  The data set is split into 
training and test sets.  The training set includes 80 percent of the data.  The test set 
contains another 20 percent of the data. 
 
1. Red Killed 
The first model is developed and tested for MOE1, the proportion of Red killed.  
The report below illustrates the size of the different layers of the network, its predicted 
accuracy on the training set and the relative importance of each variable in predicting the 
MOE in the model. 
 
a. Training 
Neural Network "Red Prop" architecture 
 
Input Layer     : 6 neurons 
Hidden Layer #1 : 8 neurons 
Output Layer    : 1 neurons 
 
Predicted Accuracy :  98.72% 
 
Relative Importance of Inputs 
Red Stealth          : 0.92148 
Recon Stealth        : 0.09658 
 Red Num             : 0.08013 
Red SSKP             : 0.00691 
Recon Sensor         : 0.00188 












b. Prediction on the Test set 
After developing the model, the test set is used to see its predictive power.  
In this report, especially, the mean absolute error is of interest, which is 0.013. 
 
 
Results for output field Red Prop 
    Error analysis for $N-Red Prop 
        Minimum Error       :        -0.23586 
        Maximum Error       :         0.064019 
        Mean Error          :        -0.0020265 
        Mean Absolute Error :         0.012959 
        Standard Deviation  :         0.026350 
        Linear Correlation  :         0.99816 
        Occurrences          :         4819 
 
1. Blue Killed 
Another network model is developed and tested for MOE2, the proportion of Blue 
killed.  The report below illustrates the size of the different layers of the network, its 
predicted accuracy on the training set and the relative importance of each variable in 




Neural Network "Blue Prop" architecture 
 
Input Layer     : 6 neurons 
Hidden Layer #1 : 8 neurons 
Output Layer    : 1 neurons 
 
Predicted Accuracy :  95.97% 
 
Relative Importance of Inputs 
Red Stealth          : 0.51905 
Red SSKP             : 0.28759 
 Red Num             : 0.18888 
Recon Stealth        : 0.06832 
Recon Firing         : 0.05855 
Recon Sensor         : 0.05846 
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b. Prediction on the Test set 
After developing the model, the test set is used to see its predictive power.  
In this report, especially, the mean absolute error is of interest, which is 0.104. 
 
 
Results for output field Blue Prop 
    Error analysis for $N-Blue Prop 
        Minimum Error       :        -0.65080 
        Maximum Error       :         0.73333 
        Mean Error          :        -0.023202 
        Mean Absolute Error :         0.10456 
        Standard Deviation  :         0.19476 
        Linear Correlation  :         0.87471 
        Occurrences          :         4819 
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APPENDIX E. LHD 22 FACTORS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix shows and explains the 22 parameters chosen in MANA for 
analysis purposes.  It also provides the ranges of each parameter. 
 
MANA Scenario File (Version 0.97a) 
February 14, 2002 
 
 
A.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / No. of agents – No. of agents belonging to a squad 
 
B.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / w1 – Controls propensity to move towards 
agents of same allegiance 
 
C.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / w2 – Controls propensity to move towards 
agents of enemy allegiance 
 
D.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / w3 – Controls propensity to move towards 
injured agents of same allegiance 
 
E.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / w8 – Controls propensity to move towards 
enemies in SA map which are of threat level 1 
 
F.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / w10 – Controls propensity to move 
towards enemies in SA map which are of threat level 3 
 
G.  Blue Squad 1-11(1 through 11) / taken shot / stealth – Probability I will not be seen 
 
H.  Blue Squad 1-11 / taken shot / fire power – Single shot kill probability 
 
I.   Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / stealth – Probability I will not be seen 
 
J.   Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / fire power – Single shot kill probability 
 
K.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / stealth – Probability I will not be seen 
 
L.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / fire power – Single shot kill probability 
 
M. Blue Squad 1-11 / taken shot / sensor range – No. of grids I can see other agents 
 
N.  Blue Squad 1-11 / taken shot / firing range – No. of grids I can shoot 
 
O.  Blue Squad 12-15 / taken shot / sensor range – No. of grids I can see other agents  
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P.  Blue Squad 12-15 / taken shot / firing range – No. of grids I can shoot  
 
Q.  Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / sensor range – No. of grids I can see other agents  
 
R.  Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / firing range – No. of grids I can shoot  
 
S.  Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / Max tgts per Step – No. of enemy I can shoot per step  
 
T.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / combat constraint – If (friends - enemies) 
<= combat, then reverse positive w2 
 
U.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / movement range – No. of grids I can move 
per time-step 
 
V.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / cluster constraint – If (friends) > cluster, 





Factor A will have settings of 4 to 35 with 129 levels evenly spread out over these values 
Factors B-F will have settings of -64 to 64 in increments of 1 that will correspond to 129 
levels 
Factors G-R will have settings of 1-129 in increments of 1 that will correspond to 129 levels 
Factor S will have settings of 1 to 15 with 129 levels evenly spread out over these values 
Factor T will have settings of -10 to 9 with 129 levels evenly spread out over these values 
Factor U will have settings of 20 to 148 in increments of 1 that will correspond to 129 levels 
Factor V will have settings of 0 to 35 with 129 levels evenly spread out over these values 
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APPENDIX F. FRACTIONAL DESIGN 6 FACTORS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix presents the six factors used in further analysis of the data and 
their levels. 
 
MANA Scenario File (Version 0.97a) 
April 21, 2002 
 
 
A.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / No. of agents – No. of agents belonging to a squad  
 
B.  Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / stealth – Probability I will not be seen 
 
C.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / stealth – Probability I will not be seen 
 
D.  Red Team 1,2 (Squad 17,18) / enemy contact / fire power  - SSKP 
 
E.  Red Recon (Squad16) / shot at / sensor range – No. of grids I can see other agents  
 





Factor A will have settings of 4, 20, and 35 (low, medium, high) 
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APPENDIX G. NETICA RANGES OF VARIABLES 
A. OVERVIEW 
This Appendix gives the ranges of variables used in Bayesian Network models. 
 
Red Killed 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 1
Blue Killed 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 1
Red NumAgents 4 14 15 24 25 35
Red w1 -64 -22 -21 21 22 64
Red w2 -64 -22 -21 21 22 64
Red w3 -64 -22 -21 21 22 64
Red w8 -64 -22 -21 21 22 64
Red w10 -64 -22 -21 21 22 64
Infantry Stealth 1 43 44 86 87 129
Infantry SSKP 1 43 44 86 87 129
Red Stealth 1 43 44 86 87 129
Red SSKP 1 43 44 86 87 129
Recon Stealth 1 43 44 86 87 129
Recon SSKP 1 43 44 86 87 129
Infantry Sensor 1 43 44 86 87 129
Infantry Firing 1 43 44 86 87 129
Vehicles Sensor 1 43 44 86 87 129
Vehicles Firing 1 43 44 86 87 129
Recon Sensor 1 43 44 86 87 129
Recon Firing 1 43 44 86 87 129
Recon Max Trgts 1 5 6 10 11 15
Red Combat -10 -3 -2 3 4 9
Red Movement 20 62 63 105 105 148
Red Cluster 0 11 12 23 24 35
low medium high
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